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INTRODUCTION
Poultry work stinks, literally and figuratively. To satisfy America's
vast appetite for chicken and turkey, approximately 225,000 primarily
immigrant workers perform the manual labor required to reduce live birds
to marketable poultry products.' They work covered in feces, fat, skin, and
blood.2 They are paid forty percent less than the average manufacturing
worker,' suffer among the highest rates of occupational injury and illness in
any industry," and receive little training, no job security, and vanishingly
1. Americans consume about eighty pounds of chicken and seventeen pounds of turkey per
capita annually, or sixteen chickens and one large turkey per person, per year. U.S. Dept. of Agric.
Econ. Research Serv., Meat Supply and Disappearance, tbls.6, 8 (Oct. 26, 2012)
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/livestock-meat-domestic-data.aspx#26168 (follow "Historical"
hyperlink for "All supply and disappearance") (listing 79.8 pounds of broiler chicken and 17 pounds of
turkey consumed per capita by U.S. retail consumers in 2009). With respect to the number of workers
employed, figures differ slightly depending on the data source. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY
CENSUS OF EMP'T & WAGES, NAICS 311615 POULTRY PROCESSING (2012) (listing 224,632 poultry
processing workers in 2010); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES: GENERAL
STATISTICS: STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY GROUPS AND INDUSTRIES: 2010 AND 2009 (2011) (listing
219,908 poultry processing workers under NAICS 311615). For a description of the demographics of
the peripheral poultry workforce, see infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
2. WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33002; LABOR PRACTICES IN THE
MEAT PACKING AND POULTRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW 46 (2005) ("Chicken catchers
are exposed to . . . skin debris, broken feather barbules, insect parts, aerosolized feed . . . poultry
excreta ... bacteria [and] dangerous gases."); Steve Striffler, Inside a Poultry Processing Plant: An
Ethnographic Portrait, 43 LAB. HIsT. 305, 306 (2002) ("The smell [inside a poultry processing plant] is
indescribable, suffocating, and absolutely unforgettable ... [B]lood, [feces], and feathers are flying
everywhere."); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS
171 (2006) ("The air [inside a chicken house] was warm and humid and smelled powerfully of
ammonia; the fumes caught in my throat.").
3. See, e.g., author-computed statistics from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
MANUFACTURES: GENERAL STATISTICS: STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY GROUPS AND INDUSTRIES: 2011
AND 2010 (2011), available at
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/j sflpages/productview.xhtml?pid=ASM_201131 GS 10
l &prodType=table (for 2011, dividing "Production Workers Wages ($1,000)" by "Production Workers
Avg Per Year" for "311615 - Poultry Processing" and multiplying by $1,000 to produce $25,128.50
average annual poultry processing wage, compared to $42,164.51 average annual wage for "31-33
Manufacturing," for a difference of $17,036.01, or 40%; for 2010, comparing $24,780.12 for poultry
processing workers to $40,967.05 for manufacturing workers, for a difference of $16,186.93, or 40%).
4. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-096, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH:
SAFETY IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY, WHILE IMPROVING, COULD BE FURTHER
STRENGTHENED 21 (Jan. 2005) (reporting that the injury and illness rates in meat and poultry processing
"continue to be among the highest of any industry"); see also U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, TABLE 1: INCIDENCE RATES OF NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY
INDUSTRY AND CASE TYPES (2010) (listing annual nonfatal injury incidence rate of 5.9 per 100 full time
employees for poultry processing).
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few opportunities for promotion.' They are rarely union members and have
few avenues for raising complaints or making claims. 6 In the language of
labor economics, this is "peripheral" labor.
The distinction between "core" and "peripheral" labor derives from the
work of economists Michael Piore, Peter Doeringer, and others on labor
market segmentation.' Labor market segmentation theory developed in
reaction to the neoclassical economic view that workers sort themselves
into the jobs they desire and for which they are qualified.' In this
conception, there is no such thing as a "good" or "bad" job, as market
mechanisms assign each worker to the most appropriate work for his or her
preferences and skills.'
Labor market segmentation theorists contend that there are in fact two
labor markets, the primary and the secondary. Primary jobs are "good"
jobs, with relatively high pay, job security, and promotion ladders.
Secondary jobs are "bad" jobs, with low wages, job insecurity, and no
5. See discussion infra Part 0-C. Promotions on the poultry industry's periphery do rarely
happen, and the lowest-level supervisory positions are often held by bilingual former line workers, but
vanishingly few workers are able to make their way from the periphery to the core. PUB. JUSTICE CTR.,
THE DISPOSABLE WORKFORCE: A WORKER'S PERSPECTIVE 29 (2009) (reporting that Latino workers are
not promoted to supervisory positions); Striffler, supra note 2, at 308 (observing that, "unlike workers,"
core supervisor Michael "enjoyed a job with some variety, almost never got his hands dirty, and could
hope to move up the corporate ladder").
6. Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by Industry, 2010,
UNIONSTATS.COM, http://www.unionstats.com/ (follow "2010" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 26, 2012)
(compiling data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey and listing 23% union
coverage of employees in the Animal Slaughtering and Processing Industry category (COC 1180));
Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by Occupation, 2010, UNIONSTATS.COM,
supra (listing 26.4% union coverage of employees in the Butchers and Meat, Fish, and Poultry
Processing category (COC 7810)); see also Tony Horwitz, 9 To Nowhere-These Six Growth Jobs Are
Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al ("Roughly 80%
[of poultry workers] are nonunion . . . ."); see also discussion infra Parts B and 0. Although only about
20% of poultry workers are unionized, this rate is in fact higher than the roughly 12% national average.
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE USDL-12-0094
(2012) available at http://www.bis.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm (last visited July 23, 2012) (listing
the 2011 union membership rate as 11.9 percent).
7. The concept of the core and periphery comes from the dual labor market, labor market
segmentation, and dual economy theories. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & PETER B. DOERINGER,
INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 165-66 (1971) (discussing the dual labor
market theory); PAUL OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTURES 69, 85 (1988) (discussing "the creation of a
relatively small-core labor force organized along the lines of the salaried model and a peripheral labor
force consisting of temporaries, part-timers, and other employees who are simply not provided with the
protections afforded the core workers"); see also Michael Reich, David M. Gordon & Richard C.
Edwards, A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation, 63 AM. ECON. REV.359 (May 1973) (discussing
labor market segmentation theory); Charles Tolbert, Patrick M. Horan & E. M. Beck, The Structure of
Economic Segmentation: A Dual Economy Approach, 85 AM. J. Soc. 1095, 1096 (1980) (describing the
differences between the primary (core) and secondary (peripheral) industries and labor markets).
8. Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 91-92 (1998) (explaining
neoclassical view).
9. Id.
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opportunity for promotion. In contrast to the neoclassical assumption, labor
market segmentation theory holds that workers may be sorted into jobs not
on the basis of their preferences and skills, but instead their race, sex, socio-
economic class, or other characteristics beyond their control. For example,
workers may be excluded from "good" jobs due to outright discrimination
or their inability to gain access to the social networks that provide an entr6e
to better work.' Once in the secondary segment, workers may find it
impossible to leave. The mere fact of having held a secondary job becomes
a stigma in itself, and secondary workers may not have the time or
resources required to obtain additional education or skills training.
Labor market segmentation theory has largely merged with a related
body of thought, dual economy theory, in which firms themselves may be
categorized as core or peripheral. Core firms are generally large and
profitable, with a stable workforce drawn from the primary labor market."
They can afford to invest in their workforce by training workers for
successively higher positions and promoting from within.12 Workers in
core firms are therefore quite valuable and able to demand the favorable
wages and working conditions associated with the primary labor market."
Peripheral firms, in contrast, tend to be smaller, less stable, and less
profitable. They draw their workforce from the secondary labor market,
require little worker skill, and provide little training. 4 Peripheral firms do
not invest in their workforce, and workers become fungible and easily
replaceable, with low bargaining power. The results are low wages, job
1o. Id. at 107 ("Rather than resulting solely from education, experience, and preferences, the
segment into which a worker initially falls also depends on social class, family background,
neighborhood, race, gender, etc.").
11. Tolbert et al., supra note 7, at 1098 (citing BARRY BLUESTONE, WILLIAM M. MURPHY &
MARY STEVENSON, LOW WAGES AND THE WORKING POOR 28-29 (1973)).
12. Id. at 1096.
13. The structure that allows promotion of workers from within is known as an internal labor
market. In such a market, the terms and conditions of work are better than what the external labor
market would otherwise dictate and better than the minimum required by law. Walter Kamiat, Labor
and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures of Individual
Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1954 (1996) (describing the norms that govern internal labor
markets as "worker protective"); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1922 (1996) (noting that although "workers
are, to a large degree, legally unprotected . . . they nonetheless receive these protections" of the internal
labor market).
14. I use the terms "low skill" and "de-skilled" throughout this article to describe peripheral
poultry work. However, I acknowledge that these jobs in fact require significant skill, but may not be
recognized as such. See, e.g., William P. Bridges & Wayne J. Villemez, Employment Relations and the
Labor Market: Integrating Institutional and Market Perspectives, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 748, 751 n.2 (Dec.
1991) (challenging the notion of "unskilled" jobs by noting that "[T]he literature in the sociology of
work is replete with examples of 'unrecognized skills."').
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insecurity, and lack of promotion opportunities - the hallmarks of
secondary jobs. 15
Labor market segmentation theory suggests that, over time, as firms
gain stability and profitability, they move from the periphery to the core,
and their once-secondary workforce takes on primary workforce
characteristics. Wages should rise and job security increase." However, a
different scenario has emerged in much of the U.S. economy. Instead of
moving wholesale to the core, firms are adopting an internal core-periphery
structure and maintaining a dual labor market within their own walls. Firms
maintain a core of managerial and supervisory workers in primary jobs, but
shift what work they can to low-paid, insecure, secondary jobs on the
periphery. "
This development is the result of a variety of factors. According to
Marion Crain, building on the work of economist Peter Cappelli, global
competition has forced U.S. firms to "cut costs, reduce time to market, and
differentiate themselves from competitors," meaning that "long-term
investments in people . . . no longer [make] good business sense.""'
Likewise, Kenneth Dau Schmidt contends that developments in trade and
technology have "brought the external labor market into American firms in
ways that we have not previously experienced and shifted the balance in our
economy away from the paradigm of lifetime employment ... and
decidedly in favor of the paradigm of short-term or contingent
employment. . . ."" And as anthropologist Robert Hackenberg has
15. Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179,
1188 (2010) ("Employers calibrate[] compensation [for peripheral workers] to the external labor market
rather than to the firm's internal market structure."); Reich et al., supra note 7, at 364 (describing "fire
trails" built across vertical job ladders that prevent movement from peripheral to core jobs).
16. Robert A. Hackenberg, Joe Hill Died for Your Sins: Empowering Minority Workers in the
New Industrial Labor Force, in ANY WAY YOU CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN
AMERICA 231, 240-41 (Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway, & David Griffith eds., 1995) ("The
concepts predict that as peripheral enterprises evolve into core industries, their secondary labor markets
should become primary. Indeed, food industries were first classified as peripheral by industrial
sociologists and later reassigned to core status. However, there has been no parallel shift in upgrading
the food industry labor market.").
17. OSTERMAN, supra note 7, at 69 ("Under this arrangement firms reduce the portion of their
work force covered by the salaried model and attempt to shift some of their work load outside the
protected portion of the internal labor market . . .
18. Crain, supra note 15, at 1188.
19. Kenneth G. Dau Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) ("[Tlhe rise of the new age of
trade and technology has brought the external labor market into American firms in ways that we have
not previously experienced and shifted the balance in our economy away from the paradigm of lifetime
employment in an internal labor market and decidedly in favor of the paradigm of short-term or
contingent employment in a spot market.").
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observed, "[T]he meat and poultry industries appear to be prime examples
of intentional reduction of dependence on primary labor." 20
Drawing on data and anecdotal accounts from a wide variety of
sources, this Article investigates the mechanics of peripheral labor,21 using
the poultry industry as a case study. The answer to the question of why
firms rely on peripheral labor is likely that it is cheap and effective; this
Article explores how conditions on the periphery came to be. What are the
mechanisms that produce the characteristic low wages, job insecurity, and
lack of promotions? How did those characteristics come about, and why do
they persist? The Article examines four sets of factors: poultry firms' labor
practices, their modes of economic organization, the transnational nature of
the labor market for peripheral poultry jobs, and the structure of the labor,
employment, and immigration laws that apply to peripheral poultry work.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the specific poultry
firm labor practices that have degraded conditions on the periphery: the de-
skilling of work and reduction in worker training; firms' tolerance, and
perhaps encouragement, of very high turnover rates; and processing plants'
location in low wage, right-to-work Southern states. Part II explores the
aspects of poultry firms' economic organization that have influenced
conditions on the periphery: vertical integration, the drive to achieve
economies of scale, and industry concentration in relatively few firms, with
plants located in rural areas.
Part III examines the effects of transnationality on peripheral poultry
work. I propose that the transnational character of the labor market
combines with and exacerbates the influences of poultry firms' labor
practices and economic organization in three interconnected ways: (1) it
provides a seemingly inexhaustible stream of peripheral workers; (2) it
allows firms to externalize the transaction costs of recruiting and hiring; and
(3) it establishes a transnational reference point for both employees and
employers.
Part IV examines the labor, employment, and immigration laws that
apply to peripheral poultry work, identifying the exemptions, exclusions,
and assumptions embedded in those laws' structures that complicate
workers' attempts to change conditions at work. Part IV also considers that
the transnational labor market supplies workers who may have limited legal
knowledge and a legal consciousness, or self-perception, that is inconsistent
20. Hackenberg, supra note 16, at 241 (emphasis added).
21. The theories of labor market segmentation and the dual economy have merged somewhat in
the literature, with primary workers sometimes referred to as core and secondary workers referred to,
variously, as precarious, contingent, or peripheral. Because of the evocative-and I think useful-
image of workers on the periphery, I adopt the terms "peripheral labor," "peripheral jobs," and
"peripheral workers" here.
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with overt methods of resistance, protest, or complaint. The key point here
is that conditions at work are not solely the result of economic forces, but
are also influenced by both the applicable legal and regulatory structures
and the methods for rights enforcement that are available to peripheral
workers.
Part V then explores whether the labor market for peripheral poultry
jobs is now in flux due to changing background legal and economic
conditions. These conditions include the economic crisis of the past half-
decade, demographic changes in Mexico that have reduced out-migration
from that country to the United States, and the highly punitive anti-
immigration laws recently passed by Georgia and Alabama, the first and
third-largest poultry producing states. Part V begins to address the effects
of these changes on the terms and conditions of peripheral poultry work and
worker bargaining power. Finally, Part VI concludes by suggesting ways
that the nature of peripheral work might be improved.
I.
LABOR PRACTICES
A. De-skilling ofJobs and Minimal Training
The task of converting live birds to millions of pounds of marketable
poultry products is performed by approximately 225,000 primarily
immigrant workers who are employed on the poultry industry's periphery.22
These workers' job duties are dictated by the place they occupy in the
production and processing chain. The processing of broiler chickens, so
named because they can be broiled, baked, or fried without extensive
stewing, are the focus of this Part due to their dominance of the industry;
the production and processing of other birds such as turkeys, ducks, and
geese, which.represent a much smaller segment of poultry output, follow
the same general outlines.23
After hatching, broiler chickens spend the first six to eight weeks of
life on grow-out farms.24 Once they have reached market weight, crews of
22. See supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., John C. Voris, Poultry Fact Sheet No. 16c: California Turkey Production UNIV.
CAL. DAVIS Coop. EXTENSION (1997), http://animalscience.ucdavis.edu/avian/pfsl6C.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2012) (describing turkey production process). For a full glossary of poultry slaughter and
disassembly terms, see Occupational Health & Safety Admin., Poultry Processing Industry E-Tool,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/poultry/glossary.htmi (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
24. See generally Poultry Tour, GA. POULTRY FED'N,
http://www.gapf.org/IndustryTour/default.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2011); DONALD D. STULL &
MICHAEL J. BROADWAY, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH
AMERICA 54 (2d ed. 2013) (describing chicken catching); Striffler, supra note 2, at 306-07 (same).
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"chicken catchers" are dispatched into the chicken houses to grab the live
birds, cage them, and load them onto trucks for transport to the processing
plant. 25 Working for ten to twelve hours a night, under the theory that the
birds are calmer then, a crew of eight or nine men can "catch" a house full
of 20,000 to 25,000 birds in three hours.26
At the processing plant, "live hang" workers, again operating in the
dark to calm the chickens, attach each bird by the feet to a hook at a
collective rate of 200 birds per minute. 27 These hooks are connected to a
line that transports the birds through a series of machines. First, the
chickens are stunned and then killed by a machine that slits their throats.
Some survive and are dispatched by the knife of a worker known as "the
backup killer."28 Machines then drain the carcasses of blood, scald them to
loosen the feathers, strip the feathers, and decapitate them. Eviscerating,
neck-breaking, washing, and chilling machinery next perform their
respective tasks, with workers operating the machines and finishing any
steps left incomplete by the automated process.29
"Rehang" workers then place each carcass on a hook or cone, which
travels down the disassembly line to a series of workers who wield saws,
scissors, and knives.30 These workers are grouped three to four to a station
and perform the same cuts thousands of times per day to debone the chicken
and reduce it to its component parts.' They collectively process between
forty and ninety birds per minute.3 2 The repetitive, high-speed motion and
close-quarters cutting required to perform these jobs contribute to poultry
workers' having one of the highest rates of occupational injury and illness
in any industry.33
25. STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 24, at 54; see Poultry Tour, supra note 25.
26. See STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 24, at 51, 54.
27. Striffler, supra note 2, at 306.
28. Interview with Tom Fritzsche, Staff Attorney, S. Poverty Law Ctr., in Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 7,
2011).
29. Id.; Horwitz, supra note 6; MARY K. MUTH ET AL., RTI INT'L, POULTRY SLAUGHTER AND
PROCESSING SECTOR FACILITY-LEVEL MODEL (2006) 2-4 fig. 2-1 (illustrating the poultry disassembly
process). A U.S. Department of Agriculture official also performs a cursory visual inspection after
evisceration. Bradley Watkins et al., Economic Feasibility Analysis for an Automated On-Line Poultry
Inspection Technology, 79 POULTRY SC. 265 (2000).
30. Fritzsche, supra note 28; see Striffler, supra note 2, at 306-07.
31. See Striffler, supra note 2, at 307.
32. See id. at 306; Horwitz, supra note 6 ("[L]ine speeds in poultry plants have been revved up to
a maximum allowable rate of 91 chickens a minute from the high 50s.").
33. See supra note 4. Worker advocates report that very high rates of on-the-job injuries are one
of poultry workers' biggest work-related concerns and are perhaps the biggest driver of the very high
industry turnover figures. Fritzsche, supra note 28. Occupational illnesses and injuries in peripheral
jobs, and the interrelationships among worker health and safety, transnationality, and turnover, are
complex issues that merit more thorough consideration than space here allows.
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Workers then throw chicken wings, breasts, thighs, tenders, and other
parts onto conveyor belts to be "further processed." 3 Depending on the
final product, other workers operate tenderizing, seasoning, breading,
frying, baking, and freezing machines, and another set of workers package,
seal, label, and ship out the chicken parts, often marked with the poultry
firm's own brand.
As poultry firms have mechanized the slaughter and disassembly
processes, there has been a related de-skillitdg of workers' jobs and a drop
off in worker training. Though poultry processing plants have not
accomplished complete mechanization, they have automated their processes
significantly, and compartmentalized and simplified the job duties of the
remaining workers to a remarkable extent. 36 As the co-founder of IBP, a
meat packing company now owned by poultry firm Tyson Foods, remarked
to a Newsweek reporter as early as 1965, "We've tried to take the skill out
of every step ... We wanted to be able to take boys right off the farm and
we've done it."" A Wall Street Journal reporter describes the results of this
"de-skilling" process, relating that "[w]orkers on 'the knife line' at most
chicken plants ... aren't even allowed to sharpen their own knives; this
task ... is given over to workers whose sole job is honing blades."
Whatever knife-sharpening skills the line workers once had have now been
removed from their jobs and transferred to other workers, whose jobs are
similarly simplified and routine.
The de-skilling of jobs produces a corresponding drop in worker
training. One account describes training as consisting of being shown a-
video and being told "to do what the person next to [you] is doing."39 The
Wall Street Journal describes a worker in the Pilgrim's Pride chill-pack
department who "trained" the reporter by saying, "Here's all I know and all
you need to. Breasts go 28 to a box, drumsticks go 24, and wings go 20.
34. Striffler, supra note 2 at 306.
35. Id. at 306-07.
36. ROGER HOROWITZ & MARK J. MILLER, JULIAN SAMORA RESEARCH INST., MICH. STATE
UNIV., IMMIGRANTS IN THE DELMARVA POULTRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY: THE CHANGING FACE OF
GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE AND ENVIRONS 3 (1999) ("In the 'modem' processing plant, mechanical
devices are extensively applied in a wide variety of cutting operations once performed by workers with
knives.. . But the chicken still needs to be inserted into the machines and positioned properly for the
cuts to be applied in the right place .... Labor may have been deskilled, and the number of knife
workers reduced, but the need for labor remains in the many positioning and transitional stages of the
dismembering and cutting operations . . .").
37. WHITTAKER, supra note 2, at 31.
38. Horwitz, supra note 6.
39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND
POULTRY PLANTS 44 (2004); see also Striffler, supra note 2, at 307 ("[The supervisor] cannot really do
the job himself and his instructions are simple: 'Do what Roberto does.' Roberto provides little formal
training, a fact that makes learning my new job a bit tricky.").
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And make sure the numbers stenciled on the box are facing forward when
you shove the box down the conveyor belt."40 In fact, training is so
minimal and de-skilling so complete that workers in some plants regularly
rotate among positions, apparently with little interruption to production,
easily replacing one another in a policy designed to minimize the repetitive
motion injuries that plague the poultry industry.4 1 As summarized by a U.S.
Department of Agriculture report, "[Poultry] jobs require dexterity with a
cutting knife but few other skills, making the tasks easily trainable and
allowing the use of abundant low-skill labor."42
Because poultry companies have created peripheral jobs that require
little skill and little training, each individual worker holds very little value
for the employer. Peripheral workers become fundamentally
interchangeable. Due to workers' fungibility, employers have no incentive
to increase wages, encourage employment longevity, or promote from
within-the sort of worker-protective terms and conditions that traditionally
appear in "core" jobs. For the same reasons, workers themselves have very
little bargaining power, because any threat to leave by a worker would
likely be met with indifference by his or her employer.
B. Tolerance ofHigh Turnover Rates
Poultry firms' de-skilling of peripheral jobs and reduction in training
go hand-in-hand with their tolerance, and perhaps encouragement, of
extremely high worker turnover rates. With the exception of the small
number of workers who have job protection as a result of union
membership (see Part I.C, infra at 365), workers are "at will" and can be
terminated for nearly any reason. Indeed, workers are terminated, or choose
to leave, in staggering numbers. Though poultry firms do not release
turnover figures, industry observers estimate that annual turnover is
between forty and one hundred percent.43 At the high end, this means that a
single plant will have to replace its entire chicken catching and disassembly
workforce of between 400 and 2,000 workers every year." In comparison,
the annual worker turnover rate for all nondurable goods manufacturing
40. Horwitz, supra note 6.
41. Fritzsche, supra note 28.
42. MICHAEL OLLINGER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AER-13, EFFECT
OF FooD INDUSTRY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 28 (Dec. 2005)
[hereinafter OLLINGER ET AL. (Dec. 2005)].
43. WHITTAKER, supra note 2, at 30, 42 (listing annual poultry turnover rates as "between 40%
and 100% annually); STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 24, at 106 (describing turnover in the poultry and
meat processing industries as being "higher than virtually any other industry").
44. WHITTAKER, supra note 2, at 30.
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firms, a category to which poultry belongs, ranged between 2000 and 2011
from a low of 28.9% to a high of 42.7%.45
General turnover statistics do not distinguish between workers who
have quit and those who are fired. The statistics include voluntary
departures due to workplace illnesses and injuries, discontent with pay and
working conditions, and a variety of other reasons. For immigrant workers,
turnover might also be driven by a desire to return to their home countries
or by deportation or removal from the United States. Turnover statistics
also include terminations that result from failure to keep up with the line
speed or production quotas, whether due to injury or otherwise, or from
violations of one of the many rules that govern life on the line.46 Finally,
these statistics also include workers terminated as a result of legally
prohibited discrimination or for other unlawful reasons, such as retaliation
for attempting to enforce protected rights.
High turnover presents no problem for poultry firms as long as
replacement workers are readily available and easily recruited to fill
vacancies. For reasons explored further in Part III, the transnational labor
market supplies a seemingly inexhaustible stream of such replacement
workers, who can be recruited and installed in peripheral jobs at very low
transaction costs. The transnational labor market also supplies workers who
might be particularly turnover-prone, as recent immigrants may have few
local ties to the communities where poultry plants are located and might be
especially likely to leave work in search of better opportunities.47
Nevertheless, turnover among peripheral workers creates at least some
costs for poultry firms, who must provide some level of new employee
orientation, even if it is only a fellow worker's explanation of the
disassembly process.4 8 Firms must also employ human resources staff to
45. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, JOB OPENINGS AND LABOR
TURNOVER SURVEY (2012) data.bls.gov/pdq/querytool.jsp?survey-jt (for "Industries," select
"Nondurable goods manufacturing," for "Regions," select "Total US," for "Data Elements," select
"Total separations," for "Rate and/or Level," select "Rate," for "Seasonal Adjustment," select both
"Seasonally adjusted" and "Not seasonally adjusted"; filter results to show 2000-2011).
46. In some plants, these rules prohibit disassembly line workers from leaving the line to go to the
bathroom during their shift or talking while working. Horwitz, supra note 6 ("[the company's] message
on bathroom trips: 'Walking off the line without someone to relieve you is not allowed. This is
considered a voluntary quit."'); PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 5, at 29 (discussing rules prohibiting
talking while working).
47. See discussion infra Part 0.
48. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE 97 (1979) ("[D]espite the quite unskilled
character of most of the work in this labor market and the consequent ability to tolerate what seem to be
incredibly high tumover rates, there is in fact an independent concern about turnover. The jobs, one can
argue, are quite simple but involve enough skill so that new workers must be shown how to perform
them and spend time, albeit a short time, perfecting what they have learned. In this atmosphere, there is
a premium placed upon labor-force continuity: The older workers show the newer ones how to perform
the job and maintain a base level of output while novices are being absorbed.").
20 12 363
BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:2
check workers' employment eligibility and update constantly changing
payroll records. Indeed, anecdotal accounts suggest that some poultry firms
have experimented with reducing turnover rates, and the associated costs,
by adopting policies that allow immigrant workers leave to return to their
home countries during holidays.49
Maintaining high turnover rates is therefore likely an intentional
strategy for poultry firms. As economist John Pencavel points out, "The
employer has to balance the advantages of operating with a low turnover
rate against the costs of higher remuneration paid to keep his labor force
contended." 0 In this calculation, many poultry employers appear to have
accepted high turnover on the periphery in exchange for the ability to offer
low wages and other employer-friendly terms and conditions of work,
rather than investing in workers and promoting employment longevity as in
the core."
Poultry firms may benefit in at least two other ways from frequent
turnover in the peripheral workforce. First, for those firms that offer
employee benefits, high turnover means that many workers leave before
completing the vesting period, thus relieving firms of the obligation under
their own policies to pay benefits or grant paid vacation leave.52  Turnover
rates may be the reason for the relatively low amounts that poultry
employers allot to employee benefits: the average annual per-worker cost of
health insurance for poultry employers is less than half the average cost for
manufacturing generally, and per-worker poultry employer contributions to
pension plans and other fringe benefit programs similarly lag behind
manufacturing averages." Second, employers may generally profit from
49. Greig Guthey, The New Factories in the Fields: Georgia Poultry Workers, 19 S. CHANGES
23, 23 (1997) ("Other factors influencing this stabilization [of turnover rates] include changes in some
companies' policies, which discourage rapid turnover and encourage long-term employment with
vacation incentives to accommodate immigrant workers' needs to visit family in Mexico.").
50. John H. Pencavel, Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in U.S. Manufacturing
Industries, 13 INT'L ECON. REV. 53 (Feb. 1972).
S. WHITEAKER, supra note 2, at 35 ("In a carefully structured and highly competitive industry,
high turnover may not be accidental. Some would argue that worker retention may be neither desirable-
nor profitable.").
52. Id. at 37 (quoting a meat packing manager that "the way fringe benefits have been negotiated
or installed, they favor long-term employees. For instance, insurance, as you know, is very costly.
Insurance is not available to new employees until they've worked there for a period of a year or, in some
cases, six months. Vacations don't accrue until the second year. There are some economies, frankly, that
result from hiring new employees.") (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., author-computed statistics from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
MANUFACTURES, supra note 3 (for 2011, dividing "Employer's cost for health insurance ($1,000)" by
"Number of employees" for "311615 - Poultry Processing" and multiplying by $1,000 to produce
$2,954.13 average health insurance cost per employee for poultry employers, compared to $6,530.18 for
"31-33 Manufacturing," more than twice the poultry figure; computing total per-worker cost of pensions
and other fringe benefits in the same way and comparing poultry ($4,371.24) to manufacturing figures
($9,781.06)).
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high turnover's dampening effect on worker bargaining power, as workers
rarely have the time on the job to develop a relationship with a union or
otherwise to demand higher wages, job security, and opportunities for
promotion.
Unscrupulous employers may even exaggerate the extent to which they
can absorb the costs of high turnover on the periphery, as a way to
encourage workers' beliefs that they are interchangeable and to discourage
worker activism. An account by a peripheral poultry worker at Tyson
Foods illustrates this phenomenon:
Tyson always gets rid of workers who protest or who speak up for others.
When [the speed of the disassembly line] jumped from thirty-two chickens
a minute to forty-two, a lot of people protested. The company came right
out and asked who the leaders were. Then they fired them. They told us "If
you don't like it, there's the door. There's another eight hundred applicants
waiting to take yourjob. "54
Thus, while the de-skilling of jobs and high turnover are themselves
indicators of poultry labor's peripheral status, these two factors also
contribute to the emergence and persistence of other peripheral
characteristics, including low wages, low worker bargaining power, lack of
job security, and lack of promotion ladders.
C. Plant Location
In the poultry industry, location is a labor practice. Most poultry firms
have chosen to locate their processing operations in the rural South,
primarily in Georgia, Arkansas, and Alabama." Locating in Southern states
allows firms to take advantage of the mild climate, low feed prices, and
proximity to grow-out farms. Importantly for the terms and conditions of
peripheral work, locating in the South also places poultry firms in states
with employer-friendly wage laws, low prevailing wages, and right-to-work
legal regimes. This allows firms to keep wages low for peripheral workers
and reduce the influence and impact of unions.
In Georgia, Arkansas, and Alabama, the top three poultry-producing
states, there is no state requirement that companies pay higher than the
54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 80 (emphasis added); see also Leigh Binford,
From Fields of Power to Fields of Sweat: The Dual Process of Constructing Temporary Migrant Labour
in Mexico and Canada, 30 THIRD WORLD Q. 503, 514 (2009) (quoting a "Mexican male with 20 seasons
work experience in Canada," who noted that "it is really hard to do something [to make a difference]. If
we protest, even if all 3000 workers stationed in Leamington did, we'd get sent back to Mexico. They
can do that because there are another 3000 Mexican workers ready to come to Canada and work.").
55. U.S. Dep't of Agric. Econ. Research Serv., Poultry & Eggs: Background,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/BriefingPoultry/, (last updated May 28, 2012) ("The top broiler-producing
State is Georgia, followed by Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina.").
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$7.25 federal minimum wage.56 Even if a firm did decide to pay higher-
than-required wages, the five top poultry-producing states - Georgia,
Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina - have between the
seventeenth and forty-ninth lowest average weekly wages in the country,
and all have average weekly wages that are below the national average. In
fact, according to a 2011 report on manufacturing, "when all costs are taken
into account, certain U.S. states, such as South Carolina, Alabama, and
Tennessee, will turn out to be among the least expensive production sites in
the industrialized world."5  Poultry industry wage data bears this out:
wages paid to peripheral poultry workers, who work primarily at plants in
the U.S. South, are forty percent lower than manufacturing wages and
twenty percent lower than wages paid in other animal processing
industries.5 9
Moreover, many Southern states in which poultry-processing plants are
located have "right-to-work" laws, under which union membership cannot
be made a condition of employment.o These pro-employer laws
complicate peripheral workers' attempts to organize and contribute to
relatively low union membership rates in private industry in Southern
states.6' In the poultry industry, about twenty percent of workers hold union
membership, half the unionization rate of workers in other meatpacking
56. In some states, state law supplements federal law, requiring a higher hourly wage, but in
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, the state minimum
wage is either below or at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. See U.S. Dept. of Labor Wage
& Hour Div., Minimum Wage Laws in the States - January 1, 2012,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [hereinafter Minimum Wage Laws].
57. Author-computed statistics from U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
QUARTERLY CENSUS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, TABLE 6: PRIVATE INDUSTRY BY STATE, 2011
ANNUAL AVERAGES (2011), available at www.bls.gov/cew/ewl Itable6.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2012)
(computing national average weekly wage as $893; ranking states by average weekly wage, with
Georgia as #17 ($852), Arkansas as #46 ($689), Alabama as #33 ($755), Mississippi as #49 ($645), and
North Carolina as #28 ($786)).
58. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., MADE IN AMERICA AGAIN: WHY MANUFACTURING WILL RETURN
TO THE U.S. 5-6 (2011).
59. See, e.g., author-computed statistics from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
MANUFACTURES, supra note 3 (calculating average per-worker poultry wages as being 40% less than
average per-worker manufacturing wages; for 2011, comparing $25,128.50 for poultry processing
workers to $31,554.07 for "Animal (except poultry) slaughtering and processing" workers, for a
difference of $6,425.57, or 20%; for 2010, comparing $24,780.12 for poultry processing workers to
$31,085.48 for other animal processing workers, for a difference of $6,305.35, or 20%).
60. See, e.g., Thomas R. Haggard, Right-to-Work Laws in the Southern States, 59 N.C. L. REV.
29 (1980).
61. Author-computed statistics from BARRY HIRSCH & DAVID MACPHERSON, UNION
MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY,
Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment by State, 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.unionstats.com/ (computing national average private employer union membership rate of
6.2%; comparing to rates in Alabama (6.7%), Arkansas (2.5%), Georgia (2.7%), Mississippi (3.4%), and
Texas (3.0%)).
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industries such as beef and pork.6 2 There have been occasional, successful
organizing campaigns at poultry plants, and there are active community
union organizations such as the Delmarva Poultry Justice Alliance that
advocate for worker rights.63 However, non-union plants remain the norm,
and organizing drives have historically been met with aggressive anti-union
strategies by poultry management.' Low unionization also means that
poultry workers lack formalized grievance procedures and opportunities for
collective bargaining that would allow them to demand concessions in the
areas of wages, job security, and promotion ladders.65
II.
EcoNoMiC ORGANIZATION
In addition to their labor practices, the modes of economic organization
that poultry firms have adopted contribute to a downgrading of the terms
and conditions of peripheral work and a diminishment of worker bargaining
power. Three characteristics of poultry firms' economic organization are
important: vertical integration, the drive to achieve economies of scale, and
industry concentration in relatively few firms, with plants located in rural
areas.
A. Vertical Integration
Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, poultry companies
became so highly vertically integrated that they became known within the
industry as "integrators."66 Integrators own or control every step of poultry
62. See supra note 6; see also Robert Bussel, Taking on "Big Chicken": The Delmarva Poultry
Justice Alliance, 28 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 7 (Summer 2003) ("Nationally, less than thirty percent of the
poultry industry's more than 200,000 workers are unionized, as compared to over double that percentage
in other forms of meatpacking.").
63. See, e.g., LEON FINK, THE MAYA OF MORGANTON: WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE NUEVO
NEW SOUTH 104-139 (2003) (describing victorious organizing campaign among peripheral poultry
workers in North Carolina); Steven Greenhouse, Union Organizers at Poultry Plants in South Find
Newly Sympathetic Ears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at Al 6 (describing union organizing campaign at
Tennessee poultry plant); DONALD D. STULL & MICHAEL J. BROADWAY, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES:
THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA 74 (2004) (describing union contract at a
Tyson chicken plant in Robards, KY).
64. Horwitz, supra note 6 ("[flndustry leaders such as Tyson and Perdue Chicken have long been
renowned for combating unions. Asked about their views of unions, poultry workers typically responded
with cautionary stories about vocal workers who were dismissed, harassed or reassigned to undesirable
jobs on the cramped de-bone line or in the chiller.").
65. See MICHAEL OLLINGER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AER-787,
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN U.S. CHICKEN AND TURKEY SLAUGHTER 17 (2000) ("Using mainly nonunion
labor in rural areas, poultry producers have been able to compensate workers with far lower wages than
red meat producers pay.") [hereinafter OLLINGER ET AL. (2000)].
66. Id. at 3; see also STEVE STRIFFLER. CHICKEN: THE DANGEROUS TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA'S FAVORITE FOOD 57 (2005) (describing the history of the industry).
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production and processing. 7 With respect to broiler chickens, for example,
integrators own the hatcheries in which chicks hatch from integrator-owned
eggs. Integrators do not own the grow-out farms on which the chicks are
raised to market weight, but they tightly control every aspect of a grow-out
farm's operation.6 8 Integrators supply the growers with chicks, feed from
integrator-owned processing mills, additives, medications, veterinary
services, and extensive technical instruction.69 Integrators then send
integrator-employed chicken catching crews to the farms, who capture and
transport the birds to integrators' processing plants.70  At the plants, more
integrator-employed workers kill the birds, reduce them to their component
parts, and package them for sale with the integrators' brand.
Poultry firms' vertical integration means that they can reduce the risk
of fluctuation in the supply and quality of chickens and turkeys, as they
own or control production and processing in its entirety." However,
integrators are heavily exposed to fluctuations in input costs, including
transportation, energy, and raw materials for feed, which are purchased
from outside suppliers. 72  These costs can change significantly due to
weather conditions and other exogenous factors. Firms cannot quickly
adjust production in response to changes in input costs, as they are locked
into a six to eight week growing cycle for chickens and a sixteen to twenty
week growing cycle for turkeys at any given time.7 In addition, the
window for slaughtering a bird when it has reached market weight is
narrow, and poultry meat is perishable, meaning that processing cannot be
delayed. 74  Moreover, despite its concentrated, seemingly oligopolistic
67. OLLINGER ET AL. (2000), supra note 65, at I1-12.
68. For a detailed economic analysis of the structure of the grower-integrator relationship, see
Charles Knoeber & Walter N. Thurman, "Don't Count Your Chickens. . .": Risk and Risk Shifting in the
Broiler Industry, 77 AM. J. AGRIC. ECoN. 486 (1995); Charles Knoeber & Walter N. Thurman, Testing
the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production, 12 J. LAB. ECON. 155 (1994);
Charles Knoeber, A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments and the Production of Broilers, 5
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 271 (1989).
69. OLLINGER ET AL. (2000), supra note 65, at 11.
70. STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 24, at 54 (describing chicken catching); Striffler, supra note
2, at 306-07 (same).
71. See OLLINGER ET AL. (2000), supra note 65, at 11 ("In the vertical coordination framework of
poultry contracting, integrators accept much of the risk of poultry growing in exchange for greater
control over both the quality and quantity of the birds.").
72. Id. at 12 ("The integrator bears all of the risks of a short-term price change affecting feed and
broiler prices."); see also id. at 19, 24 tbl. 5-1 (listing firms' inputs used to model poultry costs).
73. Poultry Tour, supra note 24 (listing the broiler chicken grow-out period as six to eight
weeks); Voris, supra note 23 (listing the turkey grow-out period as sixteen weeks for hens and twenty
weeks for toms).
74. HOROWITZ & MILLER, supra note 36, at 3 ("Ownership of the bird from conception both
guarantees a constant supply for the plant and increases exposure to risk. Minor fluctuations in feed or
transportation expenses, labor costs, and retail chicken prices can have devastating effects on profits, as
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structure (discussed in Part II.C below), poultry production is a highly
competitive business, and most firms operate with relatively slim profit
margins."
Given these constraints, one key input cost that integrators can and do
control is labor.7 6  This results in downward pressure on wages and a
reluctance on the part of employers to offer anything like the worker-
protective job security and promotion ladders of core jobs. It also creates
incentives for employers to constrain peripheral workers' bargaining power,
and to limit workers' ability to demand costly reforms, by encouraging high
turnover and emphasizing the fact of workers' fungibility.
B. Economies ofScale
As poultry firms have integrated vertically, they have also attempted to
achieve economies of scale by decreasing per-bird processing costs and
increasing plants' (and workers') efficiency and productivity. Firms have
used three strategies in their drive to achieve scale economies. First, they
have consolidated their processing operations into relatively large plants.
Between 1972 and 1992, for example, the share of poultry output handled
by plants with over four hundred employees jumped from approximately
twenty-five to eighty percent.77 Second, firms have invested in feed and
breeding technology to produce birds that are a uniform size and weight.7
This allows birds, an inherently variable natural product, to be processed by
machines to some extent. 79  Third, firms have invested in increasingly
sophisticated, and expensive, slaughter and disassembly machinery."o
A 2000 U.S. Department of Agriculture analysis found that these
strategies generated significant savings for poultry firms, concluding that
"scale economies have enabled plants operating at four times the sample
mean size to produce chicken at a cost about 15 percent less than a plant
the firms have great difficulty reducing production levels without allowing chickens to exceed optimal
weights.").
75. See Steve Bjerklie, On the Horns of a Dilemma: The U.S. Meat and Poultry Industry, in ANY
WAY YOU CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 41,42 (Donald D. Stull, Michael J.
Broadway, & David Griffith eds., 1995) (discussing narrow profit margins); THOMAS E. ELAM,
FARMECON LLC, COMPETITION IN THE U.S. CHICKEN SECTOR 5 (2010) ("[P]rofit maTgins for [chicken]
producer-processors have not improved in recent years, indicating that most, if not all, benefits of lower
real costs were competed away by market forces.") [hereinafter ELAM (2010)].
76. Bussel, supra note 62, at 4-5 ("[E]xercising tight control over the cost of labor has long
preoccupied the poultry industry and powerfully influenced employment and managerial policies.").
77. OLLINGER ET AL. (2000), supra note 65, at 6.
78. Id. at 3 (citing growers' provision of "uniform quality birds" and "more efficient feeding
operations" as contributors to poultry firms' economies of scale).
79. Id. at 30 ("Modem high-speed chicken slaughter operations must have uniform-size chickens
because changeovers require operational adjustments and shifting worker responsibilities . . .
80. Id. at 7, 13.
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operating at the same sample mean size.""' Similarly, turkey plants
achieved savings of seventeen percent per pound.8 2
To realize these gains, however, poultry firms must bear the high
capital costs of constructing large processing plants and outfitting them
with the sophisticated machinery that will slaughter, pluck, eviscerate,
cook, freeze, and package turkeys and chickens. They must also invest
significantly in both feed and breeding technology and in monitoring the
grow-out process to ensure consistent bird size and quality. Taken together,
poultry firms' investment in capital and live bird production represents
nearly seventy-six percent of their input costs for broiler chickens and sixty-
eight percent for turkeys." Labor and material costs make up the
difference.8 4
In order to make a return on these investments, firms must keep
productivity high and labor costs low. The editor of the Meat & Poultry
industry trade journal puts it as follows: "In terms of the labor force,
commodity economics holds down wage rates while increasing the pressure
for greater production, thus forcing the industry to grow ever more
dependent on cheap, and most often immigrant, labor."" This downward
pressure on the terms and conditions of peripheral work may not be
restricted to newer, larger processing plants that attempt to achieve scale
economies, as smaller, older, competitor plants will also be forced to reduce
wages to avoid losing market share." Large plant size, high machinery
costs, and expensive investment in breeding, feed, and grow-out technology
thus drive firms to keep peripheral wages low and line speeds high, to
maximize each worker's productivity and derive the greatest possible
benefit from economies of scale.
C. Industry Concentration and Location
Along with vertical integration and scale economy trends, the poultry
industry has seen a greater concentration of the business in the hands of
fewer firms. One way that economists measure industry concentration is by
using the four-firm concentration ratio, which calculates the market share
81. Id at 42.
82. Id.
83. MUTH ET AL., supra note 29, at 2-5 tbl. 2-2.
84. Id.
85. Bjerklie, supra note 75, at 45; see also OLLINGER ET AL. (2000), supra note 65, at I ("The
need to continuously reduce production costs to capture the cost savings of large plants raises worker
safety and compensation concerns for farmers who raise chickens and turkeys and for slaughter plant
workers.").
86. OLLINGER ET AL. (Dec. 2005), supra note 42, at 24 ("[Gireater scale economies from newer
plants in all industries due to organizational and technological changes pressured existing plants ... to
reduce costs, particularly wages or face a loss of profitability.").
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held by the industry's four largest producers." The ratio is not particularly
high in poultry as compared to other food manufacturing industries - 58.5%
for broilers and 55% for turkeys in 2007, as compared to 83.5% percent in
beef processing; however, the poultry industry has become markedly more
concentrated over time, increasing from a low of 23% for turkeys and 14%
for chickens in 1963." If a fifth firm is added to the analysis, the ratio rises
to 54%, and if the top ten poultry firms are considered, the market share
held rises to 77%.89 Moreover, the absolute number of broiler chicken
processors has fallen to between 38 and 50 nationwide, depending on the
study, from a high of 360 in 1960."
The trend toward concentration, combined with processing plants'
location in rural areas, means that a single firm's plant is often a
community's only significant employer and may be the only employer for
miles around. If rival firms operated multiple processing plants in a given
town, they would presumably compete for workers by offering superior
wages and working conditions. Workers would then be relatively
empowered vis-A-vis poultry firms. Instead, industry concentration and
rural plant location mean that no such competition exists, and plants have
monopsony power to set substandard and sometimes sub-legal peripheral
wages and working conditions.9 1
87. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1973) (describing four-firm concentration ratio).
88. Mary Hendrickson & William Heffernan, Concentration ofAgricultural Markets: April 2007,
UNIV. Mo. DEP'T RURAL SOCIOLOGY (2007), http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/07contable.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012); JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
AER-785, CONSOLIDATION IN U.S. MEATPACKING 8 tbl. 3-1 (2000). Concentration is also not
particularly high using another measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. See ELAM (2010), supra note
75, at 3-4; MUTH ET AL., supra note 29, at 2-20 (discussing HHI index measures).
89. Bussel, supra note 62, at 4 ("From 1990 to 2000, the market share among the top five firms
increased from forty-six percent to fifty-four percent, and the top ten firms control over seventy percent
of the market."); THOMAS E. ELAM, FARMECON LLC, GLOBAL POULTRY COMPETITION 19 (2007)
(reporting 2006 statistics for top ten producers that account for 77% of U.S. production); see also Wayne
Labs, Poultry Processors Uncover New Ways to Reduce Costs, FOOD ENGINEERING 103 (2009) ("Fifty
of the largest companies (such as Tyson Foods, Pilgrim's Pride and Perdue Farms) hold more than 90%
of the market.").
90. PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 5, at 5 ("Presently, approximately fifty chicken processors
exist nationwide - 'down from 125 in 1985, and 360 in 1960."'); ELAM (2010), supra note 75, at 18
("There were 38 commercial chicken production companies listed in the 2010 Poultry USA annual
survey of commercial producer-processors."). The number of companies is to be distinguished from the
number of the number of plants. See MUTH ET AL., supra note 29, at 2-16 (listing number of plants).
91. In economic terms, industry concentration may result in an oligopolistic structure in relation
to poultry consumers and a monopsonistic structure in relation to poultry growers and workers. In an
oligopoly, a small group of sellers (poultry firms) may abuse their market power over a large group of
buyers (poultry consumers). In a monopsony, a single buyer (the local poultry plant) may abuse its
market power over a large group of sellers or suppliers (grow-out farmers and workers).
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Analogous observations about the deleterious effect of poultry firms'
concentration and plant location have been made in the context of chicken
grow-out farmers who raise integrator-owned chicks to market weight.
According to a U.S. Department of Agriculture report:
Because production occurs in localized networks, growers in most areas
have very few integrators from which to choose. Many growers have only a
single integrator in their area and most have no more than three. The lack
of alternatives has led to controversy over production contracts and to
legislative and regulatory proposals to regulate them. 92
Some growers allege that integrators act as local monopsonies by taking
unfair and perhaps illegal advantage of their strong position in rural
communities. 93 For example, in 2010, an Oklahoma jury awarded $7.3
million to ten chicken grow-out farmers in a lawsuit against Tyson Foods. 94
The farmers claimed that Tyson coerced them to grow chickens at less than
break-even costs and retaliated against growers who refused to go along.95
Also in 2010, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
conducted joint public workshops with the U.S. Department of Agriculture
on the issues of concentration and contracting in the poultry industry.96 Just
as growers complain that they are at the mercy of the integrators, must
accept bad deals, and suffer from unequal bargaining power, so do industry
concentration and location conspire to depress the terms and conditions of
peripheral work and constrain worker bargaining power.
III.
TRANSNATIONALITY
This Part turns from the effects of poultry firms' labor practices and
economic organization on peripheral work to an examination of the impact
of the transnational nature of the labor market that supplies firms' largely
immigrant and often undocumented peripheral workers.
92. JAMES M. MACDONALD, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EIB-38, THE
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF U.S. BROILER PRODUCTION 4-5 (2008).
93. See, e.g., Dave Murphy, Farmers Look for Justice in the Poultry Industry, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 1, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-murphy/farmers-look-for-justice b 594582.html
(reporting that "poultry farmers daily face fear, uncertainty and intimidation from those companies they
contract with").
94. Curtis Killman, Tyson to appeal chicken farmers' $7.3 million verdict, TULSA WORLD, April
5, 2010,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid-14&articleid=20100405_11_0 IDABEL38763
0.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Public Workshop Agenda: Agriculture and Antitrust
Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy (2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/alabama-agenda.html.
372
EXPLAINING PERIPHERAL LABOR
Americans no longer purchase whole turkeys and chickens and cut
them up in their kitchens. Peripheral poultry workers now perform these
tasks; they cut, saw, and snip poultry carcasses to produce a range of
"further processed" products.17 The growth in further processing, which is
labor intensive, has offset the labor reductions achieved by the automation
of other parts of the slaughter and disassembly process, and has resulted in
a net increase in poultry employment even as other food production and
processing industries have seen a net decrease.98
Driven by the growth in further processing, the poultry industry's
demand for workers has outstripped the labor supply available in the rural
communities in which processing plants are located. One might imagine in
this situation that the unequal bargaining power that is common on the
periphery would disappear. Firms would begin to offer higher wages and
superior working conditions, akin to those available in the core, to entice
U.S. workers to relocate. The oil industry in North Dakota, for instance,
has increased wages to attract workers to such an extent that even
employees at local McDonald's restaurants are paid fifteen dollars per hour,
more than double the federal minimum wage.99 Instead, poultry firms have
looked to the transnational labor market to recruit an additional supply of
workers who are willing to relocate, but who, for a variety of reasons
explored in this Part, do not demand higher wages or better working
conditions in return.
Today, observers estimate that immigrant workers hold between
twenty-five and sixty percent of peripheral poultry jobs.'o Large numbers
of workers are undocumented, having crossed the border without
97. Striffler, supra note 2, at 306 ("A quarter of a century ago, most Americans bought chicken in
one form: the whole bird. Today, Tyson alone produces thousands of "further processed/ value-added"
poultry products, including nuggets, patties, franks, pet food, and a range of parts that come in a
multiplicity of shapes, sizes, textures, and flavors.").
98. MICHAEL OLLINGER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ERR-3,
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE MEAT, POULTRY, DAIRY, AND GRAIN PROCESSING INDUSTRIES, (2005)
("[T]he number of workers declined by about one-fourth in meatpacking and by about one-half in fluid
milk, but rose more than 150 percent in poultry slaughter and processing.").
99. See Brian A. Shactman, Unemployed? Go to North Dakota, MSN MONEY (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://money.msn.com/investing/unemployed-go-to-north-dakota-cnbc.aspx (reporting an "oil boom" in
which "wages are so high that even McDonald's pays $15 an hour").
100. See, e.g., W.V. Jamison, Cultural Issues in Processing Plants and on Farms, 14 J. APPLIED
POULTRY RES. 387, 387 (2005) ("It is not atypical to find processing plants with an excess of 50%
immigrant workers, and anecdotal data indicate that some plants now employ a predominantly Latino
workforce."); Horowitz & Miller, supra note 36, at 5 ("Currently, between 40% and 60% of the
workforces in various plants are thought to be non-citizens, the bulk of whom are Mexicans and
Guatemalans."); WHITTAKER, supra note 2, at 30 ("By the late 1990s the Tyson work force was very
heavily Hispanic - 40% according to Tyson, 60% or more according to union officials."); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 110 (quoting a Tyson Foods official's estimate that twenty-five
percent of poultry workers are Hispanic immigrants and poultry workers' own estimates that a
"majority" of workers are immigrants).
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authorization or overstayed a visa.o'0 These workers come primarily from
Mexico and Guatemala, but also from countries as dispersed as Laos, Haiti,
the Marshall Islands, Somalia, and Burma.'02 The labor market for
peripheral poultry jobs is therefore transnational, drawing from a worldwide
pool of immigrant workers to meet poultry firms' labor demands.
In many ways, the transnational labor market supplies the ideal worker
for poultry firms. Writing in the Journal of Applied Poultry Research, one
author commented, "[Immigrants] readily work for locally competitive
wages, their work ethic is acknowledged to be outstanding, they do not
readily unionize, and they actively recruit their relatives and friends from
their native country into the poultry industry." 03
This Part provides an explanatory framework for statements such as
these, proposing a theory of the transnational labor market as a way to
explain transnationalism's influence on the terms and conditions of work
and worker bargaining power on the periphery. I suggest that
transnationalism combines With and exacerbates the influences of the
poultry industry's labor practices and economic organization in three
interconnected ways: the transnational labor market provides a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of peripheral workers; it allows firms to externalize
the transaction costs of recruiting and hiring; and it sets up a transnational
reference point for both employees and employers.
A. Inexhaustible Labor Supply and Externalization of Worker
Replacement Costs
As Part I explained, poultry companies have de-skilled peripheral jobs.
De-skilling allows firms to tolerate extremely high turnover because
workers become interchangeable: each departing low skill worker can be
easily replaced with a new low skill worker. In such a system, labor is a
101. As in all industries, estimates of the number of undocumented workers are uncertain and
variable, but most commentators agree that the majority of peripheral poultry workers who are
immigrants are also undocumented. Fritzsche, supra note 28 (estimating that sixty percent of workers in
the Alabama poultry processing industry are Spanish-speaking immigrants and ninety percent of those
workers are undocumented); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39 at 101 (quoting a poultry worker's
estimate that two-thirds of the workforce is undocumented).
102. HOROWITZ & MILLER, supra note 36, at 5, 9 (discussing Mexican, Guatemalan, and Haitian
workers); Fritzsche, supra note 28 (discussing workers from Somalia and Burma); Striffler, supra note
2, at 305 ("Today, about three-quarters of plant labor forces are Latin American, with Southeast Asians
[including Laotians] and Marshallese accounting for a large percentage of the remaining workers.").
103. Jamison, supra note 100, at 387-88; see also ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER,
HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS: IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 37 (2003)
("Because the jobs in the secondary sector are the least attractive, and since capitalism's dynamism
regularly leads it to exhaust the available pool of labor, vacancies at the bottom of the totem pole
recurrently emerge. And so opens a portal of entry to immigrants, who however poorly educated or
unskilled in the conventional sense, nonetheless turn out to be wanted.").
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commodity and workers are fungible. Such a high-turnover labor regime
can only function, however, if (1) there is an unending supply of new
workers ready to take the vacant jobs and (2) transaction costs are low
enough such that turnover is relatively costless. The transnational labor
market meets both criteria.
In the transnational labor market, the entire developing world,
populated by millions of potential peripheral poultry workers, provides a
seemingly inexhaustible labor supply. As Michael Piore has observed:
[The] supply [of migrant labor] is extremely elastic. For practical purposes,
it should perhaps be viewed as indefinitely so. . . . Given the wide
disparities in income between developed and undeveloped areas and the size
of the underdeveloped world, there are an infinite number of new sources of
labor to draw upon as existing channels dry up.'0
Migration becomes "a labor-supply system," providing unending
replacement workers to fill the poultry industry's peripheral jobs.os
By participating in the transnational labor market, poultry firms are
also able to hold down the transaction costs associated with identifying,
recruiting, and hiring replacement workers. Firms externalize these worker
replacement costs by relying on "ethnic network recruitment," in which
employers spread word of job openings through tightly-knit immigrant
communities.10 6 Not only do firms not have to worry about their labor
supply "drying up," to use Michael Piore's term, but they also do not have
to concern themselves with the logistics or costs of hiring, since they rely
on their own workers' transnational linkages to fill vacancies.
Access to an inexhaustible transnational labor supply may also provide
unscrupulous employers with a way to further reduce worker bargaining
power. When faced with resistance, complaints, or demands by their
immigrant labor force, employers can always switch recruiting areas and
swap one more fractious immigrant group for another. While immigrants
might actually be very effective in spreading word about "bad apple"
employers through the very same ethnic networks used for recruiting, 0 7
104. PIORE, supra note 48, at 98.
105. Binford, supra note 54, at 504.
106. David Griffith, Hay Trabajo: Poultry Processing, Rural Industrialization, and the
Latinization of Low-Wage Labor, in ANY WAY YOU CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN
AMERICA 129, 141 (Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway, & David Griffith eds., 1995) ("In Georgia,
50 percent of the plants pay bonuses to current workers who bring new workers into the plants, as long
as the new employees stay for a designated period (usually 30 to 90 days)."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 39, at 109 ("Meat and poultry companies often find workers through what researchers call
'ethnic network recruitment."'); PIORE, supra note 48, at 98 ("Employers are generally in a position to
stimulate an increased supply of workers through existing channels simply by spreading the word among
their own employees that they are recruiting.").
107. See Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market, 10
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 18 ("Workers in the external labor market might also learn of the employer's
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employers can avoid reputational harm merely by shifting their recruiting
practices to separate immigrant communities.
This phenomenon can be seen in another context in the patterns
followed by agricultural employers who participate in guestworker
programs, under which employers sponsor temporary visas to import
foreign workers during periods of local labor shortage. In Canada, for
example, anthropologist Leigh Binford maintains that "Mexico was invited
to join the [Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program] in 1974 in order to
provide a check on the growing negotiating power of Caribbean
workers. .. .."0o Similarly, lawsuits filed by Mexican guestworkers in the
United States claim that employers shifted recruitment to new networks of
recruiters and new parts of Mexico to avoid rehiring workers who had sued
over unpaid wages.109
Employees become less willing to take steps to change conditions on
the job when they understand that they are commodities traded on the
transnational labor market, and when employers communicate the fact of
their fungibility. Worker bargaining power is suppressed by workers'
awareness of their own replaceability, and by their firsthand knowledge of
the extremely large transnational labor supply (their family members,
neighbors, friends, and millions of others like them who are looking for
work) from which employers can draw. Instead of engaging in overt forms
of resistance, workers may instead choose to leave their jobs, or may
channel their resistance into less obvious (and less effective) methods of
resistance. I explore these everyday forms of resistance further in Part IV.
B. Transnational Reference Point
In addition to supplying a seemingly inexhaustible stream of peripheral
workers, the transnational labor market prompts both workers and
employers to develop what some have called a "dual frame of reference."'
Both groups assess U.S. wages and working conditions against the
backdrop of wages and working conditions in workers' home countries and
against the legal requirements and prevailing practices in the United States.
As Leigh Binford observes, the "conditions in the [home] living sites serve
reputation and shy away from entering into an agreement with the employer or demand additional
guarantees.").
108. Binford, supra note 54, at 508; id. at 510 ("If Mexico refuses to supply agricultural workers
on Canadian growers' terms ... plenty of other underdeveloped Latin American and Caribbean
countries, inside and outside the [Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program], are eager to do so.").
109. See, e.g., Complaint 11185-90, Reyes-Fuentes v. Shannon Produce Farm, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d
1365 (S.D.Ga. 2009) (No. 608CV059) (alleging that Georgia grower switched recruiters and recruiting
areas in Mexico to avoid rehiring H-2A workers who had previously sued the farm for unpaid wages).
110. See, e.g., WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note 103, at 9, 40-41, 152-53, 161-63, 179.
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as a constant, and indispensable, transnational reference point" for both
parties in the employment relationship."'
1. Workers
The transnational reference point allows immigrant peripheral poultry
workers to accept substandard, and sometimes sub-legal, terms and
conditions of work. Workers are not blind to the fact that they are laboring
under poor conditions by U.S. measures. However, the options and
opportunities at home are often significantly worse. As a result, even jobs
that are peripheral in the United States may be desirable in the transnational
labor market. For example, the federal minimum wage in the United States
is $7.25 per hour and higher in some statesl 2; in comparison, the average
minimum wage for non-professional occupations in Mexico is the
equivalent of roughly $4.68 per day; while the minimum wage in
Guatemala is the equivalent of roughly $8.75 per day."3  And large
percentages of workers in those countries may not earn even the minimum
wage amounts." 4 As one live hang-worker in a Georgia poultry processing
plant remarked, "When I came over here, I didn't want to hang chicken
because nobody wants to do that. But I was glad to have a job."" 5
Ill. Binford, supra note 54, at 507. Put in different terms, workers come to the United States
because they are "pushed" by inferior conditions at home and "pulled" by the prospect of higher wages
in U.S. jobs. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 6-7 (1998) (discussing factors that drive
immigration). Interestingly, the dual frame of reference may apply on both side of the border. Once
migrants return to their home countries, they may refuse to work for inferior pay or import "Bolshevik"
ideas about their rights at work. Alternatively, they may have acquired more sophisticated and
disciplined work habits. See DAVID FITZGERALD, A NATION OF EMIGRANTS: How MEXICO MANAGES
ITS MIGRATION 146-48 (2009).
112. U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (WHD), Minimum Wage Laws in the
States - January 1, 2012, available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#.UKI11oYYQMtc
(showing seventeen states and the District of Columbia with higher-than-federal minimum wage rates).
113. Minimum Wage Laws, supra note 56; Gobierno Federal de Mexico, Servicio de
Administraci6n Tributaria, Salarios Minimos 2012,
http://www.sat.gob.mx/sitiointemet/asistencia_contribuyente/informacion frecuente/salarios minimos/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2012); Cent. Am. Data, Guatemala January 2012 Tax Calendar,
http://centralamericadata.bizlen/article/home/GuatemalaJanuary.2012 Tax_Calendar (last visited Feb.
3, 2012).
114. See, e.g., Barbara Schieber, Guatemala: 60 Percent of Workers Earn Less Then [sic]
Minimum Wage, GUAT. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011) http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/2661-
guatemala-60-percent-of-workers-earn-less-then-minimum-wage.html.
115. Greig Guthey, Mexican Places in Southern Spaces: Globalization, Work, and Daily Life in
and Around the North Georgia Poultry Industry, in LATINO WORKERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH
57, 65 (Arthur D. Murphy et al. eds., 2001).. A "recently sacked factory worker" interviewed by
political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott expressed the same sentiment: "The only thing
worse than being exploited is not being exploited." JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:
EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE 243 (1985).
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Contributing to immigrant poultry workers' dual frame of reference is
their status as target earners. Though some immigrants put down roots in
the United States and become long-term residents, many poultry workers
view their stay as temporary, planning to return home once they have
reached a target savings goal." 6 In the words of Jennifer Gordon and R.A.
Lenhardt, this self-perception as temporary, target earners combines with
the transnational reference point to "make even abusive working conditions
seem more tolerable, in part because they are perceived as a temporary
sacrifice for a valuable payoff," in the form of improved economic and
social status in the home country."'
Not only does the transnational reference point compel workers to
accept peripheral jobs in the first place, it may also prevent them from
challenging conditions once they have the job. In Albert Hirschman's
famous framework, a worker faced with problems on the job has three
options: exit, voice, or loyalty."' As evidenced by extremely high turnover
rates, many workers choose "exit."" 9 Those workers who remain on the job
can either be "loyal," accepting conditions as they are, or exercise "voice"
to try to effect change. For the workers who choose to stay, the forces of
transnationality array themselves overwhelmingly against overt "voice"
(e.g., filing a lawsuit, complaining to a government agency, or forming a
union) and in favor of relatively silent "loyalty."' 2 0
To be sure, peripheral poultry workers do join unions or participate in
lawsuits against poultry firms. Yet union membership among poultry
workers is quite low compared to other meatpacking industries, and worker
advocates report that fear keeps class and collective action lawsuits smaller
116. Gregory DeFreitas, Hispanic Immigration and Labor Market Segmentation, 27 INDUs. REL.
195, 197 (1988) ("Recent immigrants are willing to take these 'deadend' jobs because they typically
view their stay as temporary, a means to amass some target level of savings to improve their families'
living standard and social status upon return home.").
117. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161,
1220 (2008).
118. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970) ("Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather
than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs . .. "); id. at 21-25 (discussing the option to "exit,"
or take one's labor or business elsewhere); id. at 76-105 (discussing a "theory of loyalty").
119. ScoTT, supra note 15, at 245 ("'[T]hroughout the centuries one of the common man's most
frequent and effective responses to oppression [has been] flight.' . . . '[A]voidance protest' has always
proved more attractive than the risk of open confrontation.") (footnotes omitted).
120. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 118, at 92 (acknowledging that firms may institute "loyalty-
promoting institutions and devices ... [that] are often meant to repress voice alongside exit") (emphasis
in original); WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note 103, at 41 ("[T]he dual frame of reference makes it
easier for immigrants to produce the appropriate performance in workplaces where displays of
subordination are de rigueur.").
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than they likely otherwise would be. 21  For the bulk of "loyal" peripheral
workers who have made the choice to stay on the job, engaging in overt
methods of protest may be irrational and dangerous, as this behavior puts
workers at risk of retaliatory job loss, social ostracism, and deportation.
Anecdotal accounts suggest that retaliation - actual or threatened - is a
common reality for peripheral poultry workers. For example, a manager in
a Tyson Foods processing plant circulated a memo to workers stating, "You
have the right to make your own decisions but I am telling you that if you
do try [to strike] you will no longer be employed here. If myself or any of
the other management team members hear you say this or another employee
tells us about this and it can be backed up, you will no longer work here."l22
Furthermore, for undocumented workers, the constant specter of
removal or deportation creates what Gordon and Lenhardt call a state of
"legally constructed subservience."23 In the words of a poultry worker in
Northwest Arkansas:
They have us under threat [bajo amenaza] all the time. They know most of
us are undocumented- probably two-thirds. All they care about is getting
bodies into the plant. My supervisor said they say they'll call the INS
[Immigration and Naturalization Service, the predecessor to today's
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency] if we make trouble. 124
Another undocumented peripheral worker in Tennessee asks, "How can we
raise our voice if we know that we don't have papers? That we are in
danger, because if you don't like me, you can call INS, you can get
somebody that has some kind of pull and says, 'Okay, just come and pick
so many Hispanics."'"25
Workers may fear not only their own termination and deportation, but
also that the plant may shut down, or that the employer will shift recruiting
to another immigrant pool. Then everyone - not only the workers who have
complained but also their friends, families, and neighbors - will lose their
jobs. Workers who exercise "voice" may therefore trigger wide-ranging
harm that endangers others who are essentially bystanders, and the workers
who complain may face social ostracism as a result.
121. Fritzsche, supra note 28; see also Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt In Requirement Fix
the Class Action Settlement? Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MIss. L.J. 443, 465-74
(2010) (calculating opt-in rates for Fair Labor Standards Act collective actions at only fifteen percent
and identifying worker fear of retaliation as a possible reason for low plaintiff participation).
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 80 (emphasis added).
123. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 117, at 1215; see also Binford, supra note 54, at 508 ("It is
deportability, and not deportation as such, that has historically rendered Mexican labor to be a distinctly
disposable commodity.").
124. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101.
125. Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 369, 391 (1998).
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2. Employers
The dual frame of reference that arises within the transnational labor
market likely also affects poultry employers. Under a freedom of contract
conception of immigrant labor, employers may see workers' continued
presence in peripheral jobs as acquiescence to the terms and conditions of
work.'26 If conditions are really so bad, employers might ask, why do
workers stay? (Of course, large numbers of workers do leave, but some
stay, and others continue to arrive to replace those who have left.) By
adopting workers' home countries as a reference point, poultry employers
may answer the question of "why stay?" by reasoning that workers are
better off in peripheral U.S. poultry jobs than they would be as subsistence
farmers or poverty wage earners in dusty corners of the developing world.
Measuring working conditions in the U.S. against the transnational
backdrop of workers' home countries - or at least the employers'
perception of those countries - allows otherwise law-abiding employers to
become comfortable offering substandard wages and working conditions.
In this way, the transnational reference point gives employers a moral
"out." Employers can choose to see themselves as charitable actors rather
than, as some accounts have it, exploiters of vulnerable people.12 7
Though there is a dearth of studies on this particular phenomenon,
hints of this sort of attitude occasionally crop up in analogous
circumstances. For example, at a public hearing in the mid-2000s on
conditions at the T. Don Hutto Family Immigration Detention Center in
Taylor, Texas, a converted medium-security prison which had been roundly
criticized for confining children,128 a county commissioner commented:
In the earlier part of this year, I did tour the facility, and I think that a lot of
the misconceptions are unfortunate, but it is far from any prison that I've
126. Kathleen Kim, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Remarks at the Sixth Annual Labor
and Employment Law Colloquium, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2011) (discussing "freedom of contract"
conception); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 955 (1984)
("So long as it is accepted that the employer is the full owner of his capital and the employee is the full
owner of his labor, the two are free to exchange on whatever terms and conditions they see fit . . ."); see
Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown
Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 973-74 (2006) (discussing the "myth" that employees alone are
responsible for "interest in, and decisions about, which jobs to take"); see also Binford, supra note 54, at
511 (suggesting that Mexican workers may "collaborate in their exploitation by working more
intensively, and placing themselves more readily at the beck and call of employers than their self-
perceived Caribbean rivals").
127. This self-transformation into charitable actors may also be an internal justification for
retaliation taken against immigrant workers who dare complain, as they are then biting the proverbial
hand that feeds them.
128. See THE LEAST OF THESE: FAMILY DETENTION IN AMERICA, at 1:36-2:22, 2:57-3:25 (Clark
Lyda & Jesse Lyda 2009).
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ever seen, and it is far better than the conditions that the vast majority of
those people have left.129
Psychologists' and behavioral economists' notion of "framing" also
supports the hypothesis that employers are influenced by, and make use of,
their own transnational reference point. Framing theory, particularly "issue
framing," asserts that the way a controversial issue is presented can
significantly influence an individual's opinion of the underlying substantive
question. 30 Here, employers may be engaging in their own internal, self-
framing process, constructing a way of perceiving peripheral work that
justifies their own place in the employment relationship.
IV.
LEGAL STRUCTURES
Part IV examines the additional influence that legal structures have on
the terms and conditions of peripheral poultry work. This Article has
already discussed the effects of the background employment-at-will rule
and state right-to-work laws in encouraging turnover and suppressing
organizing efforts by peripheral poultry workers.'"' This Part turns to three
additional topics: peripheral poultry workers' lack of knowledge about the
U.S. legal system and laws, the exemptions and exclusions built into labor
and employment law that leave peripheral workers without coverage, and
the assumptions about private law enforcement embedded in these laws'
enforcement schemes that diminish the laws' effectiveness. As a result,
rather than provide a mechanism for changing the state of peripheral poultry
work, legal structures may help cement peripheral conditions in place.
A. Knowledge of U.S. Laws and Legal System
The transnational labor market provides a supply of peripheral poultry
workers who are particularly unlikely to have accurate knowledge of the
laws and legal system of the United States. In order to engage in formal,
overt expressions of "voice" such as filing a lawsuit, complaining to a
government agency, or forming a union, workers must know their
129. Id., at 33:35-33:55 (emphasis added) (showing comments of Cynthia Long, Williamson
County Commissioner, during public hearing).; see also ACLU, Landmark Settlement Announced in
Federal Lawsuit Challenging Conditions at Immigrant Detention Center in Texas (Aug. 27, 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/landmark-settlement-announced-federal-lawsuit-
challenging (reporting changes to be made at Hutto facility).
130. See, e.g., Thomas E. Nelson & Zoe M. Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance
and Opinion, 61 J. POL. 1040, 1041 (1999) (noting that an issue frame can provide "altemative
definitions, constructions, or depictions ofa policy problem").
131. See Part IV.A (discussing the at-will employment rule); Part L.C (discussing right-to-work
legal regimes).
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substantive rights and how to access the legal system to exercise those
rights. Pauline Kim's research on U.S. employees' knowledge about job
security suggests that workers may be deeply misinformed about the law.13 2
In Kim's studies, U.S. workers assumed that they had more protection from
discharge than they actually did under an "at will" employment regime.13
Conversely, peripheral workers in the poultry industry may believe that
they have less protection than they actually do. Peripheral poultry workers
may carry over legal knowledge from their home countries, which may
have less robust, or even less robustly enforced, labor and employment
rights regimes. They may have experience with corruption in the justice
systems of their home countries. Undocumented workers in particular may
have a deep mistrust of the U.S. government, believing that interaction even
with "friendly" or "status-neutral" agencies puts the worker at risk of
deportation.13 4  Even if workers are fully informed about their rights at
work, they may not know how to find a lawyer who speaks their language,
will accept what they can pay, and is willing to challenge the biggest, most
powerful employer in town.'
B. Coverage of the Laws
Even if peripheral poultry workers had perfect information about their
substantive workplace rights in the U.S. legal system, those rights may not
actually be of much help. Generally, labor and employment laws cover all
employees without regard to immigration status, but there are at least four
significant areas of exemption and exclusion that may leave peripheral
132. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1998) ("[R]espondents
overwhelmingly misunderstand the background legal rules governing the employment relationship.
More specifically, they consistently overestimate the degree ofjob protection afforded by law, believing
that employees have far greater rights not to be fired without good cause than they in fact have.");
Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 447 (1999) ("Contrary to the assumption commonly made by defenders of the
at-will rule, [surveys of workers in Missouri, New York, and California] indicate that workers do not
understand the default presumption [of at-will employment], but erroneously believe that the law affords
them protection akin to a just cause contract, when, in fact, they can be dismissed at will."); see also
Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker
Claims Making, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 561, 562 (2010) ("[l]t is clear that immigrant workers, like the
average low-wage worker, often lack sufficient knowledge about the laws governing work in America.
Language barriers and lack of culturally appropriate information intensify this barrier.").
133. Kim (1998), supra note 133 at 110; Kim (1999), supra note 133 at 447.
134. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1101-
03 (2011) (discussing unauthorized immigrants' mistrust of even friendly or status-neutral U.S.
government institutions); see also Associated Press, U.S. Ends Job Safety' Immigration Raids, AsSOC.
PRESS NEWS SERV., Mar. 30, 2006 (describing immigration agents masquerading as occupational health
and safety workers to arrest illegal immigrant workers).
135. In poultry plants in rural Southeastem Alabama, for example, groups of workers speak the
indigenous Guatemalan languages of Chuj, Q'anjobal, and Main. Fritzsche, supra note 28.
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poultry workers without protection. 3'6 These gaps in coverage may also
trigger a dynamic response from firms, prompting them to structure their
operations to avoid legal liability, which in turn ensures that conditions on
the periphery do not change.137
First, though labor and employment laws may cover all employees
without regard to immigration status, they do not cover all workers.
Independent contractors are generally excluded from coverage,
incentivizing firms increasingly to "contract out" their labor under
temporary, contingent, or part-time arrangements.33 A lawsuit by over one
hundred chicken catchers against Perdue Farms illustrates this phenomenon.
Until 1992, Perdue had directly employed its chicken catchers. That year,
the company changed many chicken catchers' status from "employee" to
"independent contractor" and ceased paying overtime and benefits.13 9
In 1998, the chicken catchers sued Perdue, claiming unpaid overtime
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Maryland wage and hour law.'40
Perdue argued that the chicken catchers were independent contractors
employed by middle-man "crew leaders."l 4' As a Perdue spokesperson
commented to the Baltimore Sun, "We have nothing to do with the way
these individuals are compensated."' 42
Ultimately, the court ruled for the chicken catchers and ordered Perdue
to pay three years' back overtime pay. "' Though this result favored
peripheral poultry workers, it also likely provided a reorganizational
blueprint for poultry firms to avoid similar outcomes in future lawsuits. In
fact, after the chicken catchers' overtime case was filed, Perdue purchased
its first automated chicken catching machine.1" Recently, the company laid
136. Keith Cunningharn-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L.
REV. 1361 (2009) (exploring the coverage of undocumented workers under labor and employment law).
137. Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 440 (1995) ("If
employers change their policies in response to a complaint or lawsuit, they often do so in a way that is
tailored only to avoid legal liability, leaving the core exploitative conditions intact.").
138. Dau Schmidt, supra note 19, at 3-5 (discussing changing structure of the employment
relationship).
139. Kate Shatzkin, Perdue Sued by Chicken Catchers, Suit Claims They are Employees, Not
Contract Workers, Issue is Overtime, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 19, 1998,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-09-19/business/I 998262085_Iperdue-chicken-catchers-
overtime..
140. Heath v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2000).
141. Id. at 456.
142. Shatzkin, supra note 139.
143. Heath, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58, 463.
144. Christopher Thorne, Perdue Workers Cry Fowl Over Automated Chicken-Catcher, FREE
LANCE-STAR, June 10, 2000, at A12, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapersnid=1 298&dat-200006 10&id=q-
8yAAAAlBAJ&sjid-nAgGAAAAIBAJ&pg-4964,250955 1.
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off some of its last directly-employed chicken catchers in Maryland and
Delaware, replacing them with subcontractor-supplied workers with whom
Perdue will likely disclaim any employment relationship. 145  In effect,
Perdue has reduced its exposure to lawsuits by removing the liability's
source: the workers themselves.
Second, the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts from overtime pay any
employee who, broadly speaking, performs a supervisory or managerial
role. The Act also establishes rules for what activities constitute
compensable "work." Unscrupulous employers respond to these provisions
by misclassifying workers as exempt from overtime or by requiring workers
to perform uncompensated "off the clock" activities.
A 2000 investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor found that such
abuses were widespread in the poultry industry, observing "across-the-
industry" failure to fully comply with the federal laws that govern wages.'46
Of the fifty-one poultry companies randomly audited, none had paid
workers for all hours worked and sixty-five percent had misclassified
workers as exempt from overtime.147 A decade later, illegal pay practices
have persisted. In 2010, the Department of Labor reached a consent
agreement with poultry giant Pilgrim's Pride for over $1 million in back
wages owed to 798 poultry processing workers.'48 In 2011, Tyson Foods
paid $32 million to resolve more than twenty lawsuits by 17,000 poultry
processing workers alleging that the workers had not been paid for all of
their working time, including significant amounts of time spent "donning"
and "doffing" their company-required safety gear.149
A third exclusion in labor and employment law that degrades
conditions on the poultry industry's periphery has its genesis in the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2002 decision, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National
Labor Relations Board.150  In that case, the Court held that an
undocumented worker who had been fired in retaliation for union
organizing activity was covered by the National Labor Relations Act, but
145. Associated Press, Perdue to Cut 100 Jobs in March to Save Money, THE DAILY RECORD, Feb.
17, 2011, http://thedailyrecord.com/2011/02/17/perdue-to-cut-100-jobs-in-march-to-save-money/.
146. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE SURVEY FACT SHEET 1(2001).
147. Id. at 1-2.
148. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Release 10-1073-DAL, U.S. Labor Department Resolves Back Wage
Case Against Pittsburg, Texas-based Pilgrim's Pride Corp. (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/opalmedia/press/whd/whd20100073.htm.
149. Meat and Migrants, 17 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, No. 4, Oct. 2011, available at
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=163502 0 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (noting that a
federal judge approved the settlement in September 2011); see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21
(2005) (defining which donning and doffing time was compensable under the FLSA).
150. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
384
EXPLAINING PERIPHERAL LABOR
could recover no back pay, the remedy typically available in such cases.'5'
The Court assured readers that its decision "does not mean that the
employer gets off scot-free," and that the retaliating employer would still be
required to "cease and desist its violations of the NLRA" and to
"conspicuously post a notice to employees setting forth their rights under
the NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices."'5 2
However, courts have extended Hoffman to varying degrees into other
areas of labor and employment law, weakening the legal protections
available to undocumented workers." Put simply, without the back pay
remedy, receiving a "cease and desist" order and being required to hang a
poster are unlikely to dissuade unscrupulous employers from violating the
rights of undocumented workers, if the violating conditions continue to
benefit the employers' bottom lines. Thus, to the extent that peripheral
poultry workers are undocumented, and observers believe that number to be
substantial,'5 4 Hoffman Plastic Compounds erodes workplace rights and is a
barrier to workers' attempts to make change on the periphery.
Fourth, and finally, the exclusion of undocumented workers from
unemployment insurance (UT) coverage means that extremely high turnover
among peripheral poultry workers, many of whom are undocumented,
avoids triggering unemployment costs for employers."' If undocumented
workers cannot make UI claims, then their employers' UI rates do not
increase. As Noah Zatz has commented, the experience rating feature of the
UT system is one of the only areas of employment law that discourages
turnover. 5 6  By excluding undocumented workers, the UI system allows
turnover and replacement to continue unabated within the poultry industry.
And turnover, as this Article has explored, is a key factor in creating and
maintaining conditions on the periphery.
151. Id. at 151-52; 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (allowing award of back pay for unfair labor
practices).
I52. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
153. See, e.g. Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 497 (2004). Hoffman has not been applied to bar back pay owed to workers under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for hours actually worked, however.
154. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
155. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2006) ("[Unemployment] compensation shall not be payable
on the basis of services performed by an alien unless such alien is an individual who was lawfully
admitted for permanent residence at the time such services were performed, was lawfully present for
purposes of performing such services, or was permanently residing in the United States under color of
law at the time such services were performed .... ).
156. E-mail from Noah Zatz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. L.A. Sch. of Law, to author (Mar. 16,
2012) (on file with author); see also Frank Brechling, Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor
Turnover: Summary of Theoretical Findings, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 483, 483 (finding that "the
UI tax tends to discourage labor turnover in the form of both voluntary quits and layoffs that are
replaced by hires or rehires").
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C. Effectiveness of the Laws
In addition, the assumptions about private law enforcement that are
embedded in employment and labor laws' enforcement schemes may be
wholly inapplicable to peripheral poultry workers, further undermining the
effectiveness of legal protections.
This Article argues that workers' fear of retaliatory job loss, social
ostracism, and deportation drives them to choose either "exit" or "loyalty"
over "voice," avoiding overt methods of protest such as filing a lawsuit,
complaining to a government agency, or forming a union. Of course, union
organizing, agency complaints, and participation in a lawsuit are all
protected activities under state and federal law for which employers may
not retaliate. There is also a memorandum of understanding between the
U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland Security (ICE's parent agency),
to reduce the availability of deportation as a direct tool for employer
retaliation.'57 In addition, certain employment laws such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act offer double damages and attorneys' fees to victorious
plaintiffs as an incentive for workers to challenge sub-legal pay practices.'
I refer to this set of protections and incentives as "operational rights."
Operational rights encourage statutory enforcement through private lawsuits
by directly influencing potential plaintiffs' decision-making; they put
substantive rights into operation. They are designed to increase the benefits
of taking legal action and decrease the costs, acting as a thumb on a
worker's cost-benefit scale and tipping it in the direction of exercising
"voice" on the job. Embedded in this system of operational rights is a
series of foundational assumptions about private law enforcement: that if a
potential plaintiff knows about her substantive rights, knows that those
rights were violated, and knows about her operational rights, her cost-
benefit analysis will automatically produce a decision to sue, complain, or
unionize.15 9
157. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006) (prohibiting retaliation under the National Labor
Relations Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR & U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf
158. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (providing for attorneys' fees and liquidated damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act).
159. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 186
(2003) ("The idea behind the 'private attorney general' can be stated relatively simply: Congress can
vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring suit ... [T]he
current reliance on private attorneys general . . . consists essentially of providing a cause of action for
individuals who have been injured by the conduct Congress wishes to proscribe, usually with the
additional incentive of attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff.").
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However, the experience of peripheral poultry workers confounds
these expectations in two ways. First, the set of protections and incentives
embodied in laws' operational rights is miscalibrated, failing to take into
account the influence of transnationality on a worker's cost-benefit
analysis.160  Even if a worker has full knowledge of her substantive and
operational rights, the costs of retaliatory job loss, social ostracism, and
deportation - viewed in light of the transnational reference point - simply
dwarf the benefits of double damages and attorneys' fees, the promise of
restraint by the Department of Homeland Security, and the availability of a
cause of action for retaliation. 61
High-profile immigration enforcement actions, such as the 2008 raid
on a Postville, Iowa slaughterhouse and meat packing plant, as well as
"silent" raids, the name for immigration-compliance audits by the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, merely add to worker
fear.162  The net result is a peripheral poultry workforce that, in the
aggregate, rationally accepts and then tolerates substandard terms and
conditions of work and rarely exercises worker power or voice.163
Second, even if a peripheral poultry worker's cost-benefit analysis
were to tip in favor of some overt expression of "voice," she still may not
take action, as she might not perceive herself as a claims-maker within her
workplace. Sociologist Shannon Gleeson, building on the work of Gordon
and Lenhardt, calls this concept "legal consciousness," or workers' sense of
themselves in relation to their rights.'" Gleeson proposes that
undocumented workers view themselves as temporary, hard workers who
160. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem
of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 59, 61-65 (2006) (discussing
workers' cost-benefit analyses in deciding whether to complain at work).
161. Indeed, as Emily Spieler has observed, "Retaliatory discharge lawsuits are a useful tool
primarily for professionals, managerial, and other upper income workers," but not for low wage, low
skill, non-English-speaking undocumented workers like those who labor in the poultry industry's
peripheral jobs. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REV. 119, 230 (1995).
162. Antonio Olivo, Immigration Raid Leaves Damaging Mark on Postville, Iowa, L.A. TIMES,
May 12, 2009, at A9, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/12/nation/na-postville-iowal2
(describing the arrest of 389 undocumented workers at Postville's meant packing plant in a 2008
immigration raid); Miriam Jordan, More 'Silent Raids' Over Immigration, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2011,
at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576387843087137216.html (describing the
Obama administration's "crackdown on employers of illegal immigrants" using ICE audits).
163. This miscalibration is particularly severe in the case of claims brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which prohibits typical class actions, in which most class members are anonymous (and
therefore relatively protected against retaliation), and instead requires each individual plaintiff
affirmatively to "opt in," thereby publicly announcing that she is suing her employer and potentially
opening herself up to employer reprisals. See generally Alexander, supra note 121.
164. Gleeson, supra note 132; see also Gordon and Lenhardt, supra note 117.
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do not complain. 165  By tolerating substandard conditions, peripheral
workers strike a sort of bargain with society at large: their work ethic "sets
them apart from their native-born and documented counterparts, and
ultimately justifies their undocumented presence" in the United States.16 6
Filing a lawsuit, complaining to a government agency, or organizing into a
union would upset the implicit exchange of labor for presence. In this way,
immigration law writ large, and the state of "legally constructed
subservience" that it creates for undocumented workers, serves as a
powerful silencing force.'6 1 An undocumented worker in Tennessee
explains, "We know that this is not our home, that you are not going to put
up with us. So we need to show you what we are worth - that we can do it
as fast or better than Americans."68
Instead of engaging in lawsuits and union organizing or complaining to
government agencies, peripheral poultry workers may exercise different
forms of worker power. In this conception, transnationalism does not
extinguish worker "voice" completely, even in those workers who choose
"loyalty," but rather channels protest and resistance into different modes
that better protect workers from the consequences of complaint. James C.
Scott pioneered the study of these "weapons of the weak" in his 1970s
research on the Indonesian peasantry. In Scott's construction, seemingly
powerless social groups do not exercise forms of resistance that are broadly
recognizable as such.169 Instead, they make an outward show of conformity
while engaging in minor forms of resistance that are "carefully hedged" and
165. Gleeson, supra note 132, at 590 ("When asked why they chose not to come forward about
long days or dangerous working conditions, many undocumented workers repeatedly explained that to
do so would simply not be characteristic of a good worker, championing their willingness to do work
others would not.").
166. Id. at 589 (concluding from forty-one interviews with undocumented restaurant workers in
Houston, TX and San Jose, CA that many hold the view that their work ethic "ultimately justifies their
undocumented presence here"); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 117, at 1223 (labeling this "identity
work designed to respond in some way to the negative stereotypes and stigma associated with their
particular groups"); Barbara Ellen Smith, Market Rivals or Class Allies? Relations between African
American and Latino Immigrant Workers in Memphis, in GLOBAL CONNECTIONS AND LOCAL
RECEPTIONS: NEW LATINO IMMIGRATION TO THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 299, 309 (Fran
Ansley & Jon Shefner eds., 2009) ("Out-performing American workers ... was a pragmatic strategy for
maximizing the likelihood of retention and referral by employers, as well as a cultural posture that
countered any disparagement attached to 'immigrant,' 'illegal alien' or 'Mexican."').
167. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 117, at 1215.
168. Ansley, supra note 125, at 391.
169. SCOTT, supra note 115, at xv ("[M]ost subordinate classes throughout most of history have
rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized, political activity. Or, better stated, such activity was
dangerous, if not suicidal.. . . Formal, organized political activity, even if clandestine and revolutionary,
is typically the preserve of the middle class and the intelligentsia; to look for peasant politics in this
realm is to look largely in vain. It is also-not incidentally-the first step toward concluding that the
peasantry is a political nullity unless organized and led by outsiders.").
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designed to avoid "all-or-nothing confrontations."' 70 Into this category of
"ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups," Scott places "foot
dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned
ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage.""' He also discusses the ability
of relatively powerless groups to create "backstage" social spaces from
which the more powerful are excluded.' 72
First person accounts of twenty-first century peripheral poultry work in
the rural U.S. South echo Scott's observations about workers' using
"weapons of the weak" in 1970s agricultural Indonesia. Anthropologist
Steve Striffler worked in an Arkansas poultry processing plant as a
harinero, literally "flour man," or operator of a "rebreader" machine that
breads cuts of chicken. In his telling:
Forms of worker expression are necessarily muted on the plant floor by the
intensity of the work, the noise, and the supervision. Knowing glances,
practical jokes, cooperation, and shared pain bind workers in ways that
require little acknowledgment or expression. In the cafeteria or break room,
however, the situation is quite different. What the plant floor suppresses, the
break room embraces. Twice a shift, for 30 minutes, workers watch
Spanish-language television, eat and exchange food, complain about
supervisors, and relax their bodies... Supervisors almost never enter the
break room, and when they do they are noticeably uncomfortable. At least
here, the inmates are in charge.173
Striffler also describes his and a fellow worker's covert acts of resistance
against Michael, their overbearing supervisor. When the rebreader jammed:
Roberto would suddenly forget how to fix the machine. He would simply
watch Michael try to correct the impending disaster by frantically calling a
mechanic on his walkie-talkie. The mechanic would eventually arrive, talk
to Michael, stare at the machine for 10 minutes, and then swallow his pride
and ask Roberto what the problem was. Roberto would then look at
Michael, smile at [Striffler], and fix it in a matter of seconds.174
Worker advocates familiar with peripheral poultry work also report stories
of workers jamming machines with chicken bones to protest too-fast line
speeds."' These muted expressions of worker "voice" call to mind one
explanation for the etymology of the term "sabotage": textile workers in the
Netherlands in the 15th century jammed their wooden shoes, or sabots, into
170. Id at 285.
171. Id at xvi.
172. SCOTT, supra note 114, at xvii.
173. Striffler, supra note 2, at 311 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 310.
175. Fritzsche, supra note 28.
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the cogs of looms to stop production in order to "force concessions from
their employers."76
Many other examples of everyday forms of resistance by peripheral
poultry workers likely exist. These unobtrusive protests are ways that
otherwise "loyal" peripheral workers can challenge the terms and
conditions of work and exercise "voice" without endangering their own and
their communities' livelihoods. These become especially important when
the law does not cover peripheral workers, when they lack legal knowledge,
or when their legal consciousness does not permit overt acts of resistance.
However, though these anonymous, small-scale acts may provide some
outlet for worker "voice," even for those who remain loyal on the whole,
they rarely produce structural reform."'
V.
A TRANSNATIONAL LABOR MARKET IN FLUX?
This Article has described and explained the mechanics of peripheral
labor in the U.S. poultry industry. It has examined the terms and conditions
of peripheral poultry work, the level of peripheral workers' bargaining
power, and the availability of opportunities for "voice."
I find explanations for the state of peripheral poultry work in firms'
labor practices and modes of economic organization. To this analysis I add
the effects of the transnational labor market and its delivery of a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of laborers from the developing world to fill peripheral
poultry jobs. Finally, I consider the impact of the labor, employment, and
immigration laws that apply to peripheral poultry work. The result of the
confluence of these forces is a peripheral poultry workforce that accepts
inferior terms and conditions of work with relatively little protest, and what
protest does occur is covert, anonymous, and generally ineffective at
achieving structural reform.
Presently, however, the transnational labor market for peripheral
poultry work may be best described as dynamic, in a period of flux due to
the economic crisis of the past half-decade, demographic changes in
countries that traditionally send immigrants to the U.S., and new, highly
punitive anti-immigration laws passed by Georgia and Alabama, the first-
and third-largest poultry producing states. What effect, if any, have these
background legal and economic changes had on the supply of peripheral
poultry workers, the power of their transnational reference point, and their
176. RANDY HODSON & TERESA A. SULLIVAN, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 71 (5th ed.
2012). Thanks to Paul Lombardo for this observation.
177. SCOTT, supra note 115, at 29-30 ("The 'weapons of the weak'... are unlikely to do more
than marginally affect the various forms of exploitation that peasants confront.").
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legal knowledge and legal consciousness? Beyond the effect on
transnational workers, what effect have these changes had on the terms and
conditions of peripheral poultry work itself?
Answering these questions may pose a chicken and egg problem (pun
intended). What came first: bad conditions on the periphery, or the
transnational nature of the labor market? Put another way, would
conditions on the poultry industry's periphery exist today if those jobs were
held by U.S. workers? Is it fair to blame the transnational worker for
causing the sub-minimum and sometimes sub-legal conditions under which
he or she works? These complex questions deserve their own full treatment
in a separate article, though I offer some initial suggestions here. 7 1
Since the economic crisis began in the mid-2000s, immigration to the
United States from Mexico has dropped precipitously, to the point that out-
migration from Mexico to the United States may have stopped or even
reversed course. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, this "standstill"
results from a combination of factors, including the faltering U.S. economy,
intensified border enforcement, and the falling Mexican birth rate.' 7 1 In
addition, immigration to the United States from all sending countries
appears to have "paused" during the period of the Great Recession.s 0
Compounding the effects of the stagnant economy are the anti-
immigration laws passed in 2011 by Georgia and Alabama."' Among other
provisions, these laws empower local police to enforce federal immigration
laws; mandate that most employers participate in e-Verify, a federal
program designed to check workers' immigration status; require that people
178. For an interesting exploration of these questions, see Kathleen C. Schwartzman, Lettuce,
Segmented Labor Markets, and the Immigration Discourse, 39 J. BLACK STUD. 129 (2008).
179. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero - and Perhaps Less, 6-7, (2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report final.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2012)..
180. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Madeleine Sumption & Aaron Terrazas, Migration and
Immigrants Two Years After the Financial Collapse: Where Do We Stand? MIGRATION POLICY INST. 24
(2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-BBCreport-2010.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012);
Damien Cave, Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/06/world/americas/immigration.html
(discussing the depressed U.S. economy as one of many reasons that Mexican workers have chosen not
to emigrate). But see Miriam Jordan, Far Fewer Enter U.S. Illegally From Mexico, WALL ST. J., Dec.
13, 2011, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052970203518404577094722741385882.html (reporting
contentions by scholars that the drop in Mexican immigration has been driven in part by demographic
changes within Mexico, and that immigration "'won't rebound back to levels we saw in the early
2000s.').
181. Ann Morse et al., Immigration Policy Project, State Omnibus Immigration Legislation and
Legal Challenges, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx (describing Georgia
and Alabama state immigration laws).
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prove their immigration status before receiving any government services;
and force public schools to verify students' immigration status.18 2
Media and industry outlets report that these laws have resulted in an
outflow of immigrant workers from the two states, causing labor shortages
in poultry processing, agriculture, and other immigrant-reliant industries."'
A 2011 survey of 132 agricultural employers by the Georgia Agribusiness
Council, for example, reported that forty-six percent were experiencing a
labor shortage, and many blamed Georgia's new immigration law for
driving away undocumented and documented workers alike.'84
Some Georgia employers have raised wages and provided other
benefits in an attempt to lure replacement workers to the state. Blackberry
grower J.W. Paulk has increased the per-box piece rate paid to pickers by
seventeen percent (from $3.00 to $3.50). Blueberry grower Lynn
McKinnon has been "passing out fliers in Florida, promising workers free
transportation to Georgia, and free motel stays" for the course of the harvest
season.185
It is not yet known whether poultry firms in Alabama and Georgia
have begun offering higher wages or other benefits to recruit new workers
to fill peripheral jobs, or whether the workers who have stayed in peripheral
poultry jobs have demanded these sorts of concessions. However, one
immigrant fish processing worker in Alabama interviewed by Bloomberg
Businessweek seems to have found his "voice," commenting, "I will say to
[my supervisors], 'If you pay me a little more-just a little more-I will
stay working here ... Otherwise, I will leave. I will go to work in another
state. "'186
182. Id.
183. See, e.g, Campbell Robertson, In Alabama, Calls for Revamping Immigration Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at Al5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ll/17/us/in-alabama-calls-
for-revamping-immigration-law.html?pagewanted=all (discussing complaints of "severe labor
shortages" by "farmers and poultry plant operators"); Ga. Agribusiness Council, Agriculture Industry
Labor Survey 3 (June 2011),
http://aghost.net/images/e0191701/June_2011_Ag_1ndustryLabor Survey.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2012) ("[E]ven my legal Hispanic workers don't want to stay in our state for fear of being harassed!").
184. John C. McKissick & Sharon P. Kane, An Evaluation ofDirect and Indirect Economic Losses
Incurred by Georgia Fruit and Vegetable Producers in Spring 2011 - A Preliminary Data Analysis and
Summary Working Paper, UNIV. OF GA. CTR. FOR AGRIBUSINESS AND ECON. DEv. (2011),
http://www.caed.uga.edu/publications/201 1/pdf/GeorgiaFruitandVegetableSurveyAnalysis-3.pdf (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012) (reporting that "148 [of 189] survey respondents . . . had experienced labor
shortage, representing 80.3% of the survey production acreage and 37.3% of Georgia's 2009 acreage").
185. Craig Schneider, Farm Owners, Workers Worry About Immigration Law's Impact on Crops,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 3, 2011 (profiling Paulk); Richard Fausset, Fewer Hands in the Fields, L.A.
TIMES, June 18, 2011 (profiling McKinnon)..
186. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Why Americans Won't Do Dirty Jobs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/why-americans-wont-do-dirty-jobs-
1109201 l.html.
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These anecdotes suggest that the seemingly inexhaustible stream of
workers supplied by the transnational labor market is being constricted by
both legal and economic forces. As a result of the limited labor supply,
wages may be rising and workers may be becoming more empowered, at
least in the few Georgia and Alabama cases profiled by the media.
Ostensibly, this confirms this Article's hypothesis that transnationality
helps to depress the terms and conditions of peripheral work and reduce
peripheral workers' bargaining power. Once transnationality is constrained,
these effects seem to be reversed. Carried to its conclusion, the trend of
stagnant or declining immigration could result in poultry and other
immigrant-employing firms' ceasing to rely on the transnational labor
market. They would be forced to improve the nature of peripheral work,
much like the oil industry of North Dakota, in order to attract local workers
to peripheral jobs.'"
As alluring as this simple supply-and-demand story may be, however,
the real story is probably more complicated, for at least three reasons. First,
while legal and economic forces might currently be constricting the
transnational labor supply, this constriction may be temporary. Other
sending countries may replace Mexico; the economy will eventually
improve; and state immigration laws will likely be modified or overturned
by court decisions like 2012's Arizona v. United States,'" repealed in the
face of opposition by powerful business lobbies, or preempted by a federal-
level overhaul of the country's immigration laws.18 9 Meanwhile, in
response, poultry firms could move their operations to states with more
lenient (or no) immigration policies, which have likely already attracted the
undocumented workforce that has fled Georgia and Alabama.
Each of these scenarios would reopen peripheral jobs to the
transnational labor market and restore the status quo ante. And even if
federal immigration reform were to provide legal status to the country's
undocumented workforce, thereby increasing peripheral workers'
bargaining power, many reform proposals include "guestworker" programs
that would require a worker to keep a job with a particular employer in
187. See Shactman, supra note 101 (describing high wages offered to attract oil industry workers).
188. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (striking down portions of Arizona's anti-
immigration law, the template for the Georgia and Alabama legislation).
189. For example, Alabama's governor, House speaker, and Senate president have recently
announced that they will work together to revise that state's law. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to
Hear Challenge to Arizona's Immigration Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-challenge-of-arizonas-restrictive-
immigration-law/2011/12/12/gIQA4UYepO story.html; George Talbot, Immigration Law a Political
Quandary for Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley, MOBILE PRESS-REG., Dec. 21, 2011 (reporting that
Alabama's governor, House speaker, and Senate president announced jointly that they would work to
revise the state's immigration law).
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order to keep his or her immigration status. This sort of employer-specific
immigration system would merely reinstate the power imbalance that
presently exists on the periphery in the guise of "legalization."' 90
Second, there is no evidence that immigrant-employing industries'
labor practices or modes of economic organization have undergone
structural change. This Article argues that labor practices and economic
organization set the terms and conditions of peripheral work, whereas
transnationality merely acts as an accelerant. As Fran Ansley, Leticia
Saucedo, and others have rightly pointed out, the very structure of the U.S.
economy and employers' preference for a cheap, subservient workforce
may be more to blame for the nature of peripheral jobs than immigrants'
willingness to work for less, under worse conditions.' 9 ' Therefore, even if
the transnational labor market does remain less accessible to U.S.
employers, then the nature of peripheral work still will not improve unless
the fundamental nature of work improves, until, as Marion Crain puts it,
"long-term investments in people . . . [again make] good business sense."'9 2
Third, despite their efforts, employers like Georgia growers Paulk and
McKinnon have been unsuccessful in recruiting local workers to fill the
vacuum left by the departing immigrant workforce. Georgia and Alabama
employers have been widely quoted lamenting that "[1]ocal people show no
interest in the types of jobs that we need filled and the few who do apply
last only a couple days before quitting. .. ."'9 Employers blame the
difficult, physical nature of peripheral work for local workers' inability or
unwillingness to keep these jobs. However, it is possible that employers
have not sufficiently sweetened the deal or improved the fundamental
190. See, e.g., Suzy Khimm, Gingrich: Citizen Juries Should Decide Which Illegal Immigrants
Stay or Go, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-
klein/post/gingrich-citizen-juries-should-decide-which-illegal-immigrants-stay-or-
go/2011/1l/27/glQAjlOL2N blog.htmi (discussing "Red Card" program proposed by Republican
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, a large-scale expansion of the current guest-worker program
which ties workers' immigration status to a particular employer). In fact, immigrant-employing
industries may be exaggerating the extent and impact of their labor shortages so that the discussion
around immigration reform will bend in their favor, producing immigration laws that favor employers
over workers.
191. See generally Saucedo, supra note 126; Ansley, supra note 125, at 395-96 ("What is
frequently missed is that these phenomena are integral to the new economies of the center, not the result
of alien persons carrying 'third world conditions' on the sheen of their skins, in the folds of their clothes,
or in the habits of their homeland."); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 117, at 1178-79 ("Employers
actively created the conditions that led native workers to leave the industry and hastened the process by
recruiting immigrants to replace them.").
192. Crain, supra note 15, at 1188.
193. See, e.g., Ga. Agribusiness Council, supra note 184, at 1, 3 ("Georgia residents do not want to
do the hard physical labor required in my business. . . . Since we cannot find immigrant labor, we are
trying to hire non-immigrant labor. Even with pay rates above SI0 an hour, we cannot find people
interested in working outdoors, in the heat. They will stay for one or two days and then leave.").
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nature of the jobs, to attract local workers. The higher wages offered by
Paulk, for example, would increase workers' earnings by only eight dollars
per day.'94 Similarly, a survey of 230 Georgia farmers by the state
agricultural commissioner in the wake of the immigration law's enactment
reported that, of 11,000 vacant jobs typically filled by immigrant workers,
almost sixty percent paid just eight dollars per hour ($320 per week),
another thirty percent paid between nine and eleven dollars per hour, and
only two percent paid sixteen or dollars or more.195
In addition, though peripheral work may now be less transnational in
reality, the perception of transnationalism can be "sticky." Peripheral jobs
have become branded as "immigrant work," and the associated stigma may
repel local workers.19 6 There is a question, then, whether the concessions
that employers would have to offer to attract a local workforce would be so
costly as to drive companies out of business or off shore to access the
transnational workers directly who firms once employed within the United
States.
CONCLUSION
Neither legal and economic restrictions on immigration, nor collective
bargaining through unionization, nor private enforcement of workplace
laws appear to hold the key to improving conditions on the periphery. If
not these strategies, what might work? What might make these jobs better,
regardless of who holds them? Federal immigration reform that provides
legal status to undocumented workers that is not tied to a particular
employer would be a positive development.197 However, that may be a long
term and politically treacherous process. Moreover, any solution that
focuses only on the transnational aspect of peripheral work would be
incomplete, as it would fail to address the role of firms' own labor practices
194. Schneider, supra note 185 (reporting Paulk wage increase).
195. Jay Bookman, Ga's Farm-Labor Crisis Playing Out as Planned, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June
17, 2011, 7:22 AM), http://blogs.ajc.com/jay-bookman-blog/2011/06/17/gas-farm-labor-crisis-playing-
out-as-planned/; see also Fausset, supra note 185 ("Few here believe that native Southerners, white or
black, wish to return to the land their ancestors once sharecropped or tended in bondage.").
196. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 117, at 1178-79 (discussing "immigrant work"); Dwoskin,
supra note 186 (quoting immigration scholar Douglas Massey noting that the category of "immigrant
work" is culturally contingent, as automobile manufacturing is stigmatized as "immigrant work" in
Europe but not in the United States).
197. The longer a worker remains in the United States, the more attenuated her connection to her
"home" reference point may become. In other words, an individual worker's dual frame of reference
may diminish over time. The distorting effects of the transnational labor market may therefore be
countered if undocumented peripheral workers are allowed a path to permanent legal status. See, e.g.,
PIORE, supra note 48, at 64-65 (discussing the "settlement process" in which immigrants anticipate
staying in the host country for a longer period of time and begin to value a higher income stream, job
security, and prospects for advancement).
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and modes of economic organization, as well as the structure of labor,
employment, and immigration law, in depressing the terms and conditions
of work and limiting worker bargaining power.
One solution, perhaps, is suggested by Lola Smallwood Cuevas,
director of the Los Angeles Black Worker Center, who has remarked, "The
problem with sweatshops is that they are not integrated."'91 She refers not
to integration in the structural, organizational sense, but rather in the sense
of the demographics of the workforce. This may be the problem with the
poultry industry as well, in which, as Part III described, the workforce is
becoming increasingly immigrant. Alliances across immigration status,
language, race, and ethnicity lines could allow workers to focus on their
shared interest in changing the structure of peripheral work: improving
wages, reducing workplace injuries and illnesses, achieving job security,
and winning promotions from the periphery to the core. There are examples
of this sort of cross-group cooperation in the community union movement.
The Delmarva and Georgia Poultry Justice Alliances, the Mississippi
Poultry Workers for Equality and Respect, and the Poultry Workers Justice
Project unite African American and Latino workers, as well as workers and
poultry grow-out farmers, in their struggles to improve conditions
throughout the industry.199 Creating inter-group solidarity, reducing
balkanization in the workplace, and developing a sense of community
among peripheral workers is a gradual and difficult process, but may hold
some promise for improving the state of peripheral work.200
Another possible solution might lie in consumer-driven market
discipline. Change on the periphery would be more likely if poultry firms
had economic incentives to improve conditions. Consumers' increasing
savvy about the origins and safety of their food supply could provide just
such an incentive. Maintaining a high-turnover replacement regime on the
periphery results in a disengaged, devalued workforce with little training,
little experience on the job, and little motivation to comply with food safety
198. Lola Smallwood Cuevas, L.A. Black Worker Ctr., Remarks at the Sixth Annual Labor and
Employment Law Colloquium, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2011).
199. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 63 (discussing community unionism); Bussel, supra note 62
(profiling the Delmarva Poultry Justice Alliance); Angela C. Stuesse, Race, Migration, and Labor
Control: Neoliberal Challenges to Organizing Mississippi's Poultry Workers, in LATINO IMMIGRANTS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SOUTH 91 (Mary E. Odem & Elaine Lacey eds., 2009)
(profiling Mississippi Poultry Workers for Equality and Respect).
200. See generally Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace:
Toward a Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 MICH. J. L. REFORM 447 (2008); Noah Zatz, Beyond the
Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.. 63 (2002); Reva B.
Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011); Kathryn Abrams, Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of
Gender and Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2010) (all discussing strategies for coalition-building
among social groups).
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protocols. 2 01 Food safety experts agree that "[e]xtensive training of line
workers is critical" in maintaining food safety standards; the more
experience and training an employee has, the more motivated she is to
produce an uncontaminated product.202 Studies have shown that high
turnover rates like those in the poultry industry impede effective
implementation of food safety procedures and pave the way for
contamination.203
Further, contamination is extremely costly to both consumers and
firms. A 2011 study found that bacteria-infected poultry products have
caused over 1.5 million illnesses annually, nearly 12,000 hospitalizations,
and 180 deaths.2" In addition, when product recalls by publicly-traded
poultry and meat companies involve serious threats to consumer health,
shareholder value is reduced by up to three percent, and this loss persists for
months after the recall announcement.205 An observer of the impact of an E.
Coli outbreak in spinach in 2006 put it starkly, "[O]ne harvest from a single
field of spinach literally destroyed the spinach market overnight from which
the industry has yet to fully recover." 20 6
In an era in which movies like Food, Inc. are nominated for Academy
Awards, and books like The Omnivore's Dilemma are bestsellers, poultry
201. Food safety experts report a link between high worker turnover and difficulties in maintaining
food safety standards and a positive association among an employee's job experience, training, and
motivation to follow food safety protocols. T.R. McAloon, HACCP Implementation in the United
States, in MAKING THE MOST OF HACCP 70 (Tony Mayes & Sarah Mortimore eds., 2005) (reporting
that "the greatest difficulty" in implementing a food safety plan at food producer Cargill "was
experienced by locations with the highest number of employees with the highest turnover rate"); cf
Margaret Binkley & Richard Ghiselli, Food Safety Issues and Training Methods for Ready-to-Eat Foods
in the Grocery Industry, 68 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 27, 28 (2005) (describing employee turnover as a major
food safety concern for grocery store executives); Ungku Fatimah Ungku Zainal Abidin, Susan W.
Arendt & Catherine H. Strohbehn, An Exploratory Investigation on the Role of Organizational
Influencers in Motivating Employees to Follow Safe Food Handling Practices, IOWA STATE UNIV.
(2011), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1284&context-gradconf hospitality
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012) (finding, in a study of foodservice employees' motivations to comply with
food safety protocols, that employees with longer foodservice experience who had also received food
safety training "were more motivated to follow safe food handling" guidelines).
202. JULIE K. NORTHCUTT & SCOTT M. RUSSELL, UNIV. OF GA. CooP. EXTENSION, BULLETIN
1155, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF HACCP IN A POULTRY PROCESSING PLANT2 (2010).
203. McAloon, supra note 201, at 70.
204. MICHAEL B. BATZ, SANDRA HOFFMANN & J. GLENN MORRIS, JR., UNIV. OF FLA. EMERGING
PATHOGENS INST., THE 10 PATHOGEN-FOOD COMBINATIONS WITH THE GREATEST BURDEN ON PUBLIC
HEALTH II tbl. ES-3 (2011).
205. Michael R. Thomsen & Andrew M. McKenzie, Market Incentives for Safe Foods: An
Examination of Shareholder Losses from Meat and Poultry Recalls, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 526, 536
(2001).
206. Cary Blake, Fresh Tomato Industry Shaken by FDA Salmonella Link, Seeks Answers,
WESTERN FARM PRESS, Aug. 1, 2008, at 16.
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firms have every incentive to avoid this sort of loss. 207  The nature of
peripheral work - the conditions under which our food is produced - thus
has a significant impact on poultry firms' profit, perhaps giving firms an
incentive to improve the periphery in order to improve the bottom line.
Finally, the particular economic organization of the poultry industry
might justify a more vigorous role for government in monitoring,
investigation, and enforcement.208 A targeted campaign by the U.S.
Department of Labor could fill the enforcement gap created by low union
density and a lack of private claims-making by peripheral poultry
workers. 209 Because the poultry industry is highly vertically integrated and
concentrated in the hands of relatively few firms, poultry firms present
discrete targets for government oversight. For example, in its current
Strategic Plan, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division has
already named "meat and poultry processing" as an industry with prevalent
overtime misclassification.2 lo The Department, working with the relevant
partner agencies, should expand its efforts beyond overtime to take on
occupational health and safety, discrimination in promotion opportunities,
and actual and threatened retaliation against workers who organize, raise
complaints, and otherwise express "voice" in the workplace.
Of course, as Cynthia Estlund has observed, it is impossible to expect
"regulators' sights ... to remain permanently fixed on the targeted sectors,"
as there will "simply never be enough government inspectors to do the job
alone."211 Orly Lobel and other new governance scholars have also detailed
the deficiencies inherent in government enforcement regimes, including a
lack of funding, absence of political will, and, in some cases, reliance on
207. See Hungry for Change, FOOD, INC., http://www.foodincmovie.com/about-the-film.php (last
visited Nov. 7, 2012) ("In Food, Inc., filmmaker Robert Kenner lifts the veil on our nation's food
industry, exposing the highly mechanized underbelly that has been hidden from the American
consumer ... Our nation's food supply is now controlled by a handful of corporations that often put
profit ahead of consumer health, the livelihood of the American farmer, the safety of workers and our
own environment."); POLLAN, supra note 2, at 318 ("The industrial animal factory offers a nightmarish
glimpse of what capitalism is capable of in the absence of any moral or regulatory constraint
whatsoever.").
208. Cf Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 436
(2007) (making the case for increased government enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
209. A federal effort would likely be more effective than state or local initiatives. States, gripped
as they are by the economic crisis and a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, are not likely to fill this
enforcement gap, nor are localities, which, though some have enacted living wage ordinances, are not
large or well-financed enough to have any real impact on conditions on the periphery. Compare Living
Wage Program, L.A. COUNTY, http://doingbusiness.lacounty.gov/livingwage.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2011) with Rong-Gong Lin II & David Zahniser, L.A. County Won't Face Drastic Cuts, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2011, at AAI (reporting a budget shortfall of $220.9 million).
210. U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2011-2016, 32 (2010).
211. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 219, 376-77 (2005).
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tipsters and whistleblowers who, if discovered, run the same risks of
retaliatory job loss, deportation, and social ostracism described in this
Article.212
In the end, no one strategy is likely to be effective in reforming the
periphery. Some combination of immigration reform, inter-group alliances,
consumer pressure, and government enforcement may finally convince
employers that it is in their interest to make "long-term investments in
people," 2 13 to improve the fundamental nature of peripheral work.
212. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433 (2009); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil
Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998); see also DAVID WEIL,
BOSTON UNIV., IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT
TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 3, 5-6 (2010) (reporting that "almost 75 percent of all [U.S.
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division] investigations are initiated by worker complaints" and
that the budgets of the U.S. Department of Labor's four main enforcement units rose by only 3.1 percent
between 1998 and 2007, while the number of workplaces the agency is charged with regulating rose by
eleven percent).
213. Crain, supra note 15, at 1188.
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